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THE   BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH 


BY 
JOSEPH  W.  RICH 


:'i  '••  n  •> 
:•{.<•:  I. -^ 


PUBLISHED  AT  IOWA   CITY  IOWA  IN   1911   BY 
THE    STATE    HISTORICAL    SOCIETY    OF    IOWA 


COPYRIGHT   1911  BY  THE  STATE 
HISTORICAL     SOCIETY    OF    IOWA 


EDITOR'S  INTRODUCTION 

In  the  Battle  of  Shiloh  there  is  much  to  interest 
the  student  of  Iowa  history.  This  State  had  more 
men  in  the  conflict,  in  proportion  to  its  population, 
than  any  other.  Eleven  Iowa  regiments  of  infan- 
try were  engaged,  namely:  the  Second,  the  Third, 
the  Sixth,  the  Seventh,  the  Eighth,  the  Eleventh, 
the  Twelfth,  the  Thirteenth,  the  Fourteenth,  the 
Fifteenth,  and  the  Sixteenth.  Besides  these  regi- 
ments there  were  in  the  Twenty-fifth  Missouri, 
which  was  the  regiment  that  furnished  the  recon- 
noitering  party  sent  out  on  Sunday  morning,  April 

SM  6th,  three  Iowa  companies,  namely:  Company  F, 

g  Company  I,  and  Company  K. 

g  The  Sixth  Iowa  Regiment  claims  the  distinction 
of  being  the  first  regiment  to  disembark  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  and  the  Eighth  claims  the  distinction 
of  being  the  last  regiment  to  retire  from  the  line  in 
the  Hornets'  Nest.  Five  Iowa  regiments  were  in 
the  Hornets'  Nest;  and  three  of  the  number,  the 
Eighth,  the  Twelfth,  and  the  Fourteenth,  were  cap- 
tured. All  of  the  other  Iowa  regiments  were  in  the 
thick  of  the  conflict  on  Sunday. 


EDITOR'S  INTRODUCTION 


Before  the  close  of  the  war  there  were  promotions 
of  both  officers  and  men  from  among  those  engaged 
in  the  Battle  of  Shiloh ;  while  several  participants 
attained  civil  distinction  during  and  after  the  war. 
Major  Wm.  M.  Stone  of  the  Third  Regiment  and 
Lieutenant  Buren  R.  Sherman  of  the  Thirteenth 
Regiment  served  the  State  as  Governor.  Sherman 
served  as  Auditor  of  State  three  terms  before  be- 
coming Governor.  Major  W.  W.  Belknap  of  the 
Fifteenth  Regiment  became  Secretary  of  War ;  and 
Lieutenant  David  B.  Henderson  of  the  Twelfth 
Regiment,  after  long  service  in  the  lower  house  of 
Congress,  became  Speaker.  Many  others  from 
Iowa  who  engaged  in  the  battle  served  the  State 
in  the  General  Assembly,  in  Congress,  and  in  other 
official  stations  of  responsibility. 

Mr.  Joseph  W.  Rich,  the  author  of  this  mono- 
graph, was  himself  a  participant  in  the  battle  as  a 
member  of  Company  E  of  the  Twelfth  Iowa  Regi- 
ment. He  had  enlisted  on  October  1,  1861,  for  the 
term  of  three  years;  but  about  the  middle  of  his 
term  of  service  he  was  discharged  from  the  hospital 
on  surgeon's  certificate  of  disability.  Having  been 
on  the  field  during  both  days  of  the  battle  and  hav- 
ing subsequently  (in  1908)  gone  over  the  ground 
with  Major  D.  W.  Reed,  Secretary  of  the  Shiloh 


EDITOR'S  INTRODUCTION 


National  Military  Park  Commission,  Mr.  Rich  has 
been  able  to  bring  to  these  pages  the  first-hand  in- 
formation of  an  eye  witness  as  well  as  the  evidences 
of  documentary  sources. 

This  account  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh  first  ap- 
peared in  the  October,  1909,  number  of  The  Iowa 
Journal  of  History  and  Politics,  and  has  received 
most  favorable  comment  from  such  men  as  General 
Frederick  D.  Grant,  General  Grenville  M.  Dodge, 
General  Charles  Morton,  and  General  John  H. 
Stibbs.  Indeed,  it  is  not  often  that  a  writer  of  his- 
tory succeeds  in  being  so  accurate  in  his  presenta- 
tion of  facts  and  so  fair  and  non-partisan  in  his 
judgments  as  to  satisfy  those  who,  as  participants  in 
or  as  special  students  of  the  events  described,  have 
or  believe  they  have  first-hand  information.  Mr. 
Rich  is,  therefore,  to  be  congratulated  upon  the  uni- 
formly favorable  criticism  which  followed  the  first 
appearance  of  his  monograph. 

BENJ.  F.  SHAMBAUGH 

OFFICE  OF  THE  SUPERINTENDENT  AND  EDITOR 

THE  STATE  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  OF  IOWA 

IOWA  CITY  1911 


AUTHOK'S  PREFACE 

No  apology  is  offered  for  the  appearance  of  an- 
other paper  on  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  for  the  reason 
that  the  last  word  to  be  said  on  the  subject  has  not 
been  said,  and  indeed  will  not  have  been  said  until 
the  last  serious  misrepresentation,  made  through 
ignorance,  prejudice,  malice,  or  for  any  other  rea- 
son, has  been  corrected.  It  is  not  in  the  thought  of 
the  writer  that  he  will  be  able  to  contribute  addi- 
tional facts  to  the  literature  of  the  subject;  but  it 
is  hoped  that  the  facts  may  be  so  grouped  and  illus- 
trated as  to  leave  a  clearer  picture  of  the  battle  in 
the  mind  of  the  reader. 

As  far  as  the  writer  knows  the  movements  of  the 
battle  on  Sunday,  April  6, 1862,  have  not  heretofore 
been  illustrated  except  by  means  of  one  general 
map,  showing  progressive  movements  of  the  battle 
lines  throughout  the  day.  Such  a  map  can  be  little 
better  than  a  puzzle-picture  to  the  general  reader. 

The  original  map  from  which  the  tracings  were 
made  to  illustrate  the  Battle  of  Shiloh  was  prepared 
under  direction  of  the  Shiloh  National  Militarv 

• 

Park  Commission,  to  accompany  its  account  of  the 
battle,  entitled  The  Battle  of  Shiloh  and  the  Organ- , 


10  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

izations  Engaged,  compiled  from  official  records  by 
Major  D.  W.  Reed,  Historian  and  Secretary  of  the 
Commission.  To  insure  accuracy  in  the  original 
map,  the  field  was  carefully  platted  by  the  Commis- 
sion's  engineer,  Mr.  Atwell  Thompson,  and  the 
camps  and  battle  lines  were  located  by  Major  D. 
W.  Reed,  after  an  exhaustive  study  of  official  docu- 
ments, aided  by  the  recollections  of  scores  of  officers 
and  men  engaged  in  the  battle  on  the  respective 
sides.  The  reader  must  remember,  however,  that 
the  lines  were  never  for  a  moment  stationary,  so 
that  it  would  be  a  physical  impossibility  to  repre- 
sent them  correctly  at  short  intervals  of  time.  The 
analysis  here  given  of  the  general  map  published  by 
the  Commission,  it  is  believed,  will  aid  materially 
in  understanding  the  battle. 

Though  not  offering  an  apology  for  this  paper, 
the  writer  is  disposed  to  justify  its  appearance 
somewhat  by  referring  briefly,  by  way  of  introduc- 
tion, to  a  few  illustrative  errors  and  misrepresen- 
tations sought  to  be  corrected,  pointing  out  some  of 
the  so-called  histories  and  memoirs  where  they  are 
to  be  found.  Of  course  it  is  not  to  be  presumed 
that  these  errors  and  misrepresentations  were  in- 
tentional :  they  are  due  mainly  to  two  causes  —  to 
the  "smart"  newspaper  correspondent,  whose  main 
object  was  sensation ;  and  to  the  unreliable  historian 
whose  main  weakness  was  indolence  in  searching 


AUTHOR'S  PEEPACE  11 

for  facts.    Prejudice  may  in  a  few  cases  have  con- 
tributed to  the  pollution  of  the  historic  stream. 

Special  acknowledgments  are  due  from  the 
writer  to  Major  D.  W.  Reed,  Secretary  and  His- 
torian of  the  Shiloh  National  Military  Park  Com- 
mission, for  valuable  suggestions  in  the  preparation 
of  this  paper.  The  writer  is  also  under  obligations 
to  Lieutenant  Wm.  J.  Hahn  of  Omaha,  Nebraska, 
a  member  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Missouri,  who  was 
of  the  Major  Powell  reconnoitering  party,  sent  out 
by  Colonel  Peabody  on  Sunday  morning,  April  6th ; 
and  also  to  T.  W.  Holman  of  Rutledge,  Missouri, 
who  was  a  member  of  the  Twenty-first  Missouri  In- 
fantry and  was  with  the  regiment  when  it  went  out 
to  reenforce  the  reconnoitering  party  and  the 
pickets. 

JOSEPH  W.  RICH 

THE  STATE  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  OF  IOWA 
IOWA  CITY 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH 

One  of  the  worst  as  it  was  one  of  the  first  of  the 
sensational  stories  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh  put  in 
historic  form  was  the  account  by  Horace  Greeley  in 
his  American  Conflict.  The  camp  at  Pittsburg 
Landing  before  the  battle  is  likened  to  a  Methodist 
campmeeting,  and  the  Union  army  on  Sunday 
morning  is  represented  as  a  " bewildered,  half- 
dressed,  ....  helpless,  coatless,  musketless  mob", 
upon  which  the  enemy  sprang  "with  the  bayonet". 
This  account  has  Prentiss's  division  "routed  before 
it  had  time  to  form  a  line  of  battle ;"  and  Sherman's 
division  is  "out  of  the  fight  by  8  o'clock".1 

J.  S.  C.  Abbott  in  his  story  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh 
as  given  in  his  two-volume  History  of  the  Civil  War, 
gathered  his  material  from  the  same  sensational 
sources  and  he  used  it  in  the  same  sensational  way 
as  did  Mr.  Greeley. 

A  more  pretentious  work,  which  appeared  much 
later,  was  Scribners'  History  of  the  United  States 
in  five  volumes.  This  work  appeared  after  original 
sources  of  information  had  become  easily  accessible ; 
and  yet  in  its  account  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh  it  is 
the  sinner  of  sinners  for  untruthfulness.  It  is  no 


14  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

exaggeration  to  say  of  the  Scribners'  account  of  the 
battle  what  General  Beauregard  is  credited  with 
having  said  of  General  Halleck's  report  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  at  Washington  as  to  the  condition 
of  the  Confederate  army  after  the  evacuation  of 
Corinth  —  "it  contains  more  lies  than  lines". 

Another  of  the  sensational  type,  though  of  pre- 
tentious title,  is  Headley  's  History  of  the  Rebellion. 
Headley  represents  the  Union  officers  as  still  in 
bed,  when  the  "inundation"  came,  and  says  that 
"the  troops  seizing  their  muskets  as  they  could,  fled 
like  a  herd  of  sheep".  Unfortunately  for  the  rep- 
utation of  Mr.  Headley  as  a  historian,  the  facts  are 
all  against  him  —  he  allowed  himself  to  be  misled 
by  the  fiction-writers. 

John  Codman  Ropes,  who  enjoys  something  of  a 
reputation  as  a  critical  writer,  in  his  recent  Story  of 
the  Civil  War,  published  by  the  Massachusetts  His- 
torical Society,  shows  plainly  that  he  followed  very 
closely  the  account  as  given  by  General  Buell,  in  his 
Shiloh  Reviewed ;  and  he  shows,  also,  a  prejudiced 
judgment  against  Grant  and  in  favor  of  Buell  - 
whom  he  evidently  admired.  Mr.  Ropes  makes  it 
appear  that  none  of  the  divisions  near  the  Landing 
were  in  line  until  after  Sherman  and  Prentiss  had 
fallen  back  from  their  first  lines,  about  ten  a.  m. 
He  leaves  it  to  be  inferred  also  that  Buell  had  an  en- 
tire division  on  the  west  side  of  the  river  and  in  the 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  15 

fight  on  Sunday  night ;  and  he  figures  that  not  more 
than  five  thousand  of  Grant's  five  divisions,  which 
were  engaged  in  the  battle  on  Sunday,  were  in  line 
at  the  close  of  the  day. 

John  Fiske  is  another  writer  on  Civil  War  sub- 
jects, and  in  his  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 
he  describes  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  but  not  without 
some  rather  serious  errors.  For  instance  he  attri- 
butes the  "wait-for-Buell"  policy  to  Grant  —  it 
was  due  to  his  superior,  General  Halleck.  He  says 
that  General  McClernand  was  the  ranking  officer 
at  Pittsburg  Landing  in  General  Grant's  absence, 
which  is  not  correct  —  General  Sherman  was  the 
ranking  officer.  He  makes  no  mention  of  the  re- 
eonnoitering  party  that  went  out  from  Prentiss's 
division  before  daylight  on  Sunday  morning,  but 
says  that  "when  the  Confederates  attacked  in  full 
force  on  Sunday  morning,  the  Federals  were  in 
camp  and  not  in  line  of  battle. "  On  the  same  page, 
however,  he  gives  himself  a  flat  contradiction  by 
telling  how  Prentiss  had  formed  line  and  advanced 
a  quarter  of  a  mile,  where  he  received  "the  mighty 
rush  of  the  Confederates"  —  and  the  time  he  fixes 
at  about  half  past  five  o'clock,  which  is  an  error  of 
fully  two  hours. 

On  one  page  he  gives  the  strength  of  the  Confed- 
erate army  as  36,000,  exclusive  of  cavalry,  and  on 
another  page  his  "reckoning"  is  30,000  on  the  same 


16  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

basis.  He  criticises  General  Johnston  for  giving 
so  much  attention  to  the  divisions  of  Prentiss  and 
Sherman,  at  the  opening  of  the  battle,  when  he 
should  have  massed  heavily  against  Stuart,  the  ex- 
treme left  of  the  Union  line,  forgetting,  if  he  ever 
knew,  that  Prentiss  and  Sherman  must  be  forced 
back  before  Stuart  could  be  attacked.  The  plan 
suggested  by  Fiske  would  have  exposed  the  Con- 
federate flank  to  the  two  divisions  of  Prentiss  and 
Sherman,  which  would  have  been  a  blunder.  The 
corps  organization  of  the  Confederate  army  ap- 
pears, by  inference,  to  have  been  well  maintained ; 
whereas  they  began  to  commingle  at  the  beginning 
of  the  battle,  and  the  corps  were  practically  broken 
up  by  ten  o'clock. 

Mr.  Fiske  is  again  in  error  in  leaving  the  infer- 
ence that  an  entire  brigade  of  Nelson's  division  was 
in  at  the  close  of  the  fight  on  Sunday  night.  And 
still  another  error  is  the  statement  that  three  Con- 
federate brigades  participated  in  the  last  attack 
near  the  Landing.  He  gives  the  number  of  guns  in 
Grant's  last  line  far  below  the  facts,  and  then  specu- 
lates upon  what  might  have  been  if  General  Beaure- 
gard  could  have  "put  6,000  to  8,000  fresh  reserves 
into  the  fight  against  his  weary  antagonist",  appar- 
ently never  thinking  of  the  converse  of  the  specu- 
lation. Mr.  Fiske  appears  to  be  particularly  unfor- 
tunate in  the  handling  of  statistics.  He  makes  it 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  17 

appear  that  Lew.  Wallace  brought  7,000  men  to 
Grant's  right,  and  Nelson  about  the  same  number 
to  his  left,  on  Sunday  night  —  an  error  of  4,000  or 
more.  If  Mr.  Piske  had  trusted  less  to  Shiloh  Re- 
viewed and  more  to  official  records,  he  would  have 
made  fewer  mistakes. 

Henry  Villard,  who  was  a  newspaper  correspond- 
ent with  BuelTs  army,  has  written  what  he  calls 
" Memoirs",  and  "in  order  to  impart  greater  accu- 
racy and  perhaps  some  novelty",  to  his  "sketch" 
of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  he  goes  to  Confederate  re- 
ports for  his  information.  His  "sketch"  abounds 
in  errors,  even  to  the  misquoting  of  one  of  General 
Grant's  dispatches,  thus  changing  a  negative  to  an 
affirmative  statement. 

As  recently  as  1895  a  Brevet  Brigadier  General, 
U.  S.  V.,  Henry  M.  Cist,  in  his  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland, quotes  approvingly  from  Comte  de  Paris 's 
History  of  the  Civil  War  as  follows :  "At  the  sight 
of  the  enemy's  batteries  advancing  in  good  order, 
the  soldiers  that  have  been  grouped  together  in 
haste,  to  give  an  air  of  support  to  Webster's  bat- 
teries, became  frightened,  and  scattered.  It  is 
about  to  be  carried,  when  a  new  body  of  troops  de- 
ploying in  the  rear  of  the  guns  ....  received  the 
Confederates  with  a  fire  that  drives  them  back  in 
disorder".2  Mr.  Cist  quotes  also  from  Whitelaw 
Reid's  Ohio  in  the  War  as  follows:  "He  [Buell] 


18  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

came  into  the  action  when,  without  him,  all  was  lost. 
He  redeemed  the  fortunes  of  the  field,  and  justly 
won  the  title  of  the  'Hero  of  Pittsburg  Landing'  ".3 
Of  the  second  quotation  it  needs  only  to  be  said  that 
its  author  was  the  newspaper  correspondent  who 
wrote  the  first  sensational  and  untruthful  account 
of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh.  The  other  quotation  may 
well  pass  for  an  Arabian  Nights  tale. 

General  Lew.  Wallace,  commanding  the  second 
division  of  Grant's  army,  having  his  camp  at 
Crump's  Landing  six  miles  down  the  river  from 
Pittsburg  Landing,  has  left  for  us  his  Autobiogra- 
phy, which  in  many  respects  is  an  interesting  work. 
But  if  it  is  to  be  judged  by  its  account  of  the  Battle 
of  Shiloh,  in  which  Wallace  participated  on  the 
second  day,  the  author's  reputation  as  a  writer  of 
fiction  will  not  suffer.  General  Wallace  accepts 
the  first  stories  as  to  the  " complete  surprise"  of  the 
camp  and  offers  argument  to  prove  the  contention. 
Then  he  proceeds  to  upset  his  own  argument  by 
showing  that  Prentiss  and  Sherman  had  their  divi- 
sions in  line  of  battle  before  six  o'clock,  or  before 
the  Confederate  lines  began  to  move  to  the  attack. 
He  brings  the  advance  of  Buell's  army  on  the  field 
some  three  hours  before  it  was  actually  there ;  has 
General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  mortally  wounded  about 
the  same  length  of  time  before  the  incident  oc- 
curred ;  has  General  Johnston  killed  in  front  of  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH  19 

Hornets '  Nest.  He  credits  the  men  in  the  Hornets' 
Nest  with  holding  the  position  "for  two  or  three 
hours",  whereas  it  was  "held"  from  about  9:30  a. 
m.  to  about  5 :30  p.  m.  "against  the  choicest  chivalry 
of  the  South,  led  by  General  Johnston  himself",  to 
quote  General  Wallace.  In  fact,  General  Johnston 
led  no  assault  upon  the  Hornets'  Nest,  or  upon  any 
other  position  in  the  Union  line.  These  are  a  few 
of  many  fictions  in  Wallace's  Autobiography, 
where,  of  all  places,  the  truth  should  be  found. 

Had  it  been  true  that  the  position  at  the  Hornets ' 
Nest  was  held  "for  two  or  three  hours"  only, 
Grant's  center  would  have  been  broken  while  Nel- 
son's division  was  still  ten  miles  away,  and  about 
the  hour  when  Wallace's  division  started  on  its 
fifteen  mile  march.  In  that  event,  the  story  of  the 
Battle  of  Shiloh  would  have  been  a  different  story. 
Grant's  army  would,  probably,  have  been  defeated, 
and  Buell's  army  then  strung  out  over  thirty  miles 
of  country  road,  might  easily  have  suffered  the  same 
fate.  Fortunately,  General  Wallace  was  writing 
fiction. 

At  the  risk  of  tediousness  one  more  writer  on  the 
Battle  of  Shiloh  will  be  mentioned.  General  Buell, 
who  participated  in  the  battle  of  the  second  day,  in 
a  carefully  prepared  paper,  entitled  Shiloh  Re- 
viewed* takes  the  position  of  an  advocate  before  a 
court  and  jury,  stating  what  he  expects  to  prove, 


20  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

then  marshalling  his  facts  —  or  fictions,  as  the  case 
may  be  —  to  make  good  his  contention.  He  opens 
his  case  with  the  following  proposition:  "At  the 
moment  near  the  close  of  the  day  when  the  remnant 
of  the  retrograding  army  was  driven  to  refuge  in 
the  midst  of  its  magazines,  with  the  triumphant 
enemy  at  half -gunshot  distance,  the  advance  divi- 
sion of  a  reenforcing  army  arrived  ....  and  took 
position  under  fire  at  the  point  of  attack;  the  at- 
tacking force  was  checked,  and  the  battle  ceased 
for  the  day."  The  reader,  not  familiar  with  the 
facts,  must  necessarily  draw  two  inferences  from 
this  statement:  (1)  that  an  entire  division  of 
BuelTs  army  was  "at  the  point  of  attack" ;  (2)  that 
the  presence  of  such  a  body  of  fresh  troops  decided 
the  fate  of  the  day.  Both  inferences  are  erroneous, 
as  the  facts  will  show. 

On  one  point  of  some  importance,  General  Buell 
flatly  contradicts  himself.  In  speaking  of  the  at- 
tack near  the  Landing,  Sunday  night,  he  says,  in 
Shiloh  Reviewed,  that  the  "fire  of  the  gunboats  was 
harmless '  \  In  his  official  report  written  just  after 
the  battle,  he  says  that  the  "gunboats  contributed 
very  much  to  the  result"  —  the  repulse  of  the  en- 
emy. 

Perhaps  a  perfectly  fair  and  unprejudiced  ac- 
count of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh  ought  not  to  have  been 
expected  from  the  pen  of  General  Buell.  He  had, 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  21 

or  fancied  that  lie  had,  grievances  against  both  Gen- 
eral Grant  and  General  Halleck  —  and  he  was 
human. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH  NOT  AN  ISOLATED  INCIDENT 

The  Battle  of  Shiloh  was  not  an  isolated  incident : 
it  was  one  of  a  series  of  incidents,  more  or  less  close- 
ly related,  in  which  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  fig- 
ured prominently  and  effectively,  but  with  divided 
responsibilities.  It  is,  therefore,  proper  to  take 
into  account  conditions  precedent  to  the  battle  be- 
fore passing  judgment  upon  the  men  and  the  com- 
manders who  happened  to  be  present  at  the  moment, 
and  upon  whom  fell  the  immediate  responsibilities, 
and  who  suffered  for  the  shortcomings  of  others. 
The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  at  Pittsburg  Land- 
ing  under  the  orders  of  an  officer  superior  in  rank 
to  the  officer  in  immediate  command;  and  it  was 
there  for  a  definite  purpose.  If  it  did  not  accom- 
plish the  definite  purpose,  it  may  be  answered,  in 
extenuation  at  least,  that  it  was  not  permitted  to 
try  —  its  hands  were  tied  and  it  was  ordered  to 
"wait".  It  waited  until  compelled  to  fight  for  its 
own  safety.  It  saved  itself  from  defeat  and,  very 
probably,  saved  from  destruction  another  army  of 
equal  strength. 

It  is  of  no  consequence  who  first  suggested  the 
line  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers  as  the 


22  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

weak  point  in  the  Confederate  line  between  Colum- 
bus on  the  West  and  Bowling  Green  on  the  East. 
It  would  have  been  a  reflection  on  military  genius, 
if  the  suggestion  had  not  come  to  several  persons 
at  about  the  same  time  —  so  patent  was  the  evidence. 
It  is  of  some  importance,  however,  to  remember 
who  made  the  first  move  to  save  the  "weak  point ". 
Just  seven  months  before  the  Battle  of  Shiloh  (Sep- 
tember 6,  1861),  the  first  direct  step  was  taken 
leading  to  that  event. 

On  September  4,  1861,  General  Grant  took  com- 
mand of  the  Cairo  district  with  headquarters  at 
Cairo,  General  Fremont  being  then  department 
commander  with  headquarters  at  St.  Louis.  On  the 
day  after  taking  command  of  the  district,  General 
Grant  learned  of  an  expedition  from  Columbus  to 
occupy  Paducah  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tennessee.  A 
force  was  at  once  prepared  to  anticipate  the  Con- 
federate movement;  a  dispatch  was  then  sent  to 
headquarters  that  the  force  would  move  at  a  certain 
hour  unless  orders  were  received  to  the  contrary. 
No  order  came  back,  and  Paducah  was  occupied 
without  firing  a  shot  on  the  next  morning  much  to 
the  surprise  of  the  inhabitants  who  were  hourly  ex- 
pecting the  Confederates  then  on  the  march.  Gen- 
eral Grant  returned  to  Cairo  on  the  same  day,  find- 
ing there  the  order  permitting  him  to  do  what  was 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  23 

already  done.  The  same  movement  that  saved  the 
Tennessee  saved  also  the  Cumberland. 

Except  for  this  prompt  action  on  the  part  of  Gen- 
eral Grant  the  mouths  of  these  two  rivers  would 
surely  have  been  strongly  fortified ;  but,  instead,  the 
Confederate  line  was  forced  back  a  hundred  miles, 
in  its  center,  to  Fort  Henry  on  the  Tennessee  and 
Fort  Donelson  on  the  Cumberland  (Map  I). 

Columbus,  a  few  miles  below  Cairo,  strongly  for- 
tified and  garrisoned  by  the  Confederates,  was  so 
situated  that  it  might,  unless  threatened  from  Cairo 
and  Paducah,  throw  troops  either  west  into  Mis- 
souri or  east  by  rail  to  Bowling  Green  or  to  points 
within  easy  marching  distance  of  Fort  Henry  and 
Fort  Donelson  as  there  might  be  need.  As  a  result 
of  these  conditions,  there  was  activity  in  Grant 's 
district,  during  the  fall  and  winter  months  of  1861. 
The  battle  of  Belmont  (Nov.  7. 1861)  was  one  of  the 
"diversions"  to  keep  the  garrison  at  Columbus  at 
home.  In  the  following  January,  General  Halleck 
having  become  department  commander,  expeditions 
were  sent  out  from  Cairo  and  Paducah  to  the  rear 
of  Columbus  and  up  the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee 
—  General  C.  F.  Smith  commanding  the  latter  ex- 
pedition. General  Smith,  having  scouted  as  far 
toward  Fort  Henry  as  he  thought  advisable,  went  on 
board  the  gunboat  Lexington  "to  have  a  look"  at 
the  Fort.  The  gunboat  went  within  "about  2% 


24  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH 

miles drawing  a  single  shot  from  the  enemy 

in  response  to  four  several  shots  fired  at  them." 
In  his  report  (Jan.  22, 1862)  to  General  Grant,  Gen- 
eral Smith  said:  "I  think  two  iron-clad  gunboats 
would  make  short  work  of  Fort  Henry." 

On  the  same  day  that  General  Smith  reported  on 
Fort  Henry,  General  Grant  was  given  "permission 
to  visit  headquarters"  in  response  to  a  request  made 
some  time  before  —  but  he  soon  learned  that  advice 
and  suggestions  in  regard  to  affairs  in  his  district 
were  not  wanted,  and  he  went  back  to  his  command. 
He  ventured,  however  (Jan.  28th)  to  send  the  fol- 
lowing to  his  superior:  "With  permission,  I  will 
take  Fort  Henry  ....  and  establish  and  hold  a  large 
camp  there. ' ' 6  Permission  was  granted  on  the  30th, 
and  Grant  was  "off  up  the  Tennessee"  (February 
2nd). 

Except  for  this  appeal  for  "permission"  to  take 
Fort  Henry,  backed  by  the  advice  of  Flag-Officer 
Foote,  commanding  the  gunboat  flotilla,  the  expedi- 
tion would  have  been  delayed  at  least  two  weeks, 
giving  that  much  more  time  for  the  Confederates  to 
strengthen  themselves.  On  the  day  after  the  sur- 
render of  Fort  Henry  (February  6)  Halleck  tele- 
graphed to  Buell  that  he  "had  no  idea  of  commenc- 
ing the  movement  before  the  15th  or  the  20th  in- 
stant". 7  And  he  was  evidently  very  uneasy  about 
the  success  of  the  movement,  as  appears  from  a  dis- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH  25 

patch  sent  to  the  General-in-Chief  (McClellan)  at 
Washington  at  the  very  moment  when  Footers  guns 
were  pounding  at  the  little  mud  fort.  The  dispatch 
was  as  follows:  "If  you  can  give  me  ....  10,000 
more  men,  I  will  take  Fort  Henry,  cut  the  enemy's 
line,  and  paralyze  Columbus.  Give  me  25,000  and 
I  will  threaten  Nashville  ....  so  as  to  force  the 
enemy  to  abandon  Bowling  Green  without  a  bat- 
tle." Before  that  dispatch  was  received  in  Wash- 
ington the  thing  was  accomplished  by  a  gunboat 
bombardment  of  an  hour  and  fifteen  minutes  at 
Fort  Henry. 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  expedition 
against  Fort  Henry  was  undertaken  before  Halleck 
was  ready  for  it  and  the  fact  that  he  had  misgivings 
as  to  its  success,  he  yet  seems  to  have  been  jealous 
lest  Buell  might  share  in  the  honors  in  case  of  suc- 
cess. When  Buell  learned  of  the  movement,  which 
was  undertaken  without  consultation  with  him,  he 
telegraphed  Halleck  to  know  if  " co-operation"  on 
his  part  was  " essential  to  ....  success,"  to  which 
Halleck  replied :  "  Co-operation  at  present  not  es- 
sential."9 Buell  was  piqued  at  Halleck 's  reply, 
and  telegraphed  to  the  General-in-Chief:  "I  pro- 
test against  such  prompt  proceedings,  as  though  I 
had  nothing  to  do  but  command  'Commence  firing' 
when  he  starts  off."10 

This  episode  is  mentioned  only  for  the  purpose  of 


26  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

showing  that  there  were  personal  complications  be- 
tween these  three  commanders  that,  possibly,  had 
some  bearing  on  the  Battle  of  Shiloh.  The  affairs 
of  the  succeeding  three  weeks,  after  Fort  Henry, 
did  but  complicate  the  complications,  and  upon  Gen- 
eral Grant  fell  the  unfavorable  results. 

No  person  was  more  surprised  than  was  General 
Halleck  at  the  success  of  the  expedition  to  Fort 
Henry,  but  he  continued  to  appeal  to  the  General- 
in-Chief  for  "more  troops"  while  Grant  was  pre- 
paring to  advance  upon  Fort  Donelson  and  after 
the  investment  of  that  place :  (February  8th)  with- 
out more  troops,  "I  cannot  advance  on  Nashville" ; 
(February  10th)  "Do  send  me  more  troops.  It  is 
the  crisis  of  the  war  in  the  West ' ' ;  (February  14th) 
' '  Can 't  you  spare  some  troops  from  the  Potomac  ? ' M1 

Two  days  after  the  last  appeal,  Fort  Donelson 
surrendered,  and  Clarksville  and  Nashville  waited 
only  to  be  "occupied".  They  were  occupied,  re- 
spectively, on  the  21st  and  25th,  without  opposition. 
Nashville  was  occupied  by  Nelson's  division  of 
Buell's  army  which  was  sent  to  reenforce  Grant  at 
Donelson ;  but,  arriving  too  late,  it  was  sent  directly 
forward  to  Nashville  by  order  of  Grant,  the  latter 
following  in  person  for  the  purpose  of  conferring 
with  Buell  —  and  this  last  move  came  near  being 
the  undoing  of  General  Grant  who  mortally  offend- 
ed his  superior  by  pushing  the  campaign  too  rapid- 


THE  BATTLE   OP   SHILOH  27 

ly,  arousing  at  the  same  time  the  jealousy  of  Buell 
by  occupying  Nashville  just  ahead  of  his  [Buell 's] 
army  approaching  from  the  North.  General  Grant 
was  in  "ahead  of  the  hounds",  at  Nashville  —  that 
was  his  only  offense. 

FROM  FORT  DONELSON  TO  SHILOH 

On  the  day  that  Nashville  was  occupied  by  the 
Union  troops  (February  25)  the  Confederates  be- 
gan the  evacuation  of  Columbus,  the  last  defense  on 
the  original  line,  and  began  at  once  to  establish  a 
new  line  along  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad  from 
Columbus  southward  to  Corinth  and  from  Memphis 
eastward  through  Corinth  to  Chattanooga  on  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  with  General 
Beauregard  in  command,  Corinth  being  the  stra- 
tegical point  at  the  crossing  of  the  two  roads 
(Map  I). 

After  the  evacuation  of  Nashville  the  Confeder- 
ates under  General  Johnston  moved  southward  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  striking  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  road  at  Decatur,  thence  moving  west  to 
Corinth,  the  advance  reaching  that  place  March 
18th.  General  Johnston  reached  Corinth  on  the 
24th,  assuming  command  of  the  combined  Confed- 
erate forces  on  the  29th. 

The  commanders  of  the  two  Union  armies,  Hal- 
leek  and  Buell,  after  Nashville,  did  not  fully  agree 


28  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH 

as  to  the  best  plan  of  following  up  the  advantages 
already  gained.  Buell  thought,  with  the  General- 
in-Chief  (McClellan),  that  Chattanooga  was  of 
"next  importance"  after  Nashville12  and  he  pre- 
pared to  follow  Johnston  south.  Halleck  thought 
that  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  River  offered  the 
opportunity  to  strike  the  enemy's  center  at  or  near 
Corinth 13  and  he  urged  Buell  to  join  him  in  that 
movement,  but  without  avail.  A  few  days  later, 
however,  General  Halleck  secured  what  he  had  long 
desired,  the  consolidation  of  the  two  Departments 
with  himself  in  command.  Halleck  urged  his 
claims  on  two  grounds:  (1)  that  all  of  the  armies 
of  the  West  should  be  under  one  command,  and  (2) 
that  the  command  should  fall  to  him  in  recognition 
of  the  successful  campaign  against  Fort  Henry  and 
Fort  Donelson  in  his  Department.14  The  consolida- 
tion took  place  on  March  llth,  after  which  date 
General  Buell  was  subject  to  orders  from  St.  Louis, 
as  General  Grant  had  been  from  the  first.  General 
Buell 's  advance  southward  from  Nashville  had 
reached  Columbia  on  Duck  River  before  the  con- 
solidation (March  10),  but  his  headquarters  were 
still  at  Nashville. 

On  the  first  of  March  it  appears  that  General 
Halleck  notified  General  Grant  that  his  column 
would  move  "up  the  Tennessee",  and  that  the  main 
object  would  be  "  to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge  over 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  29 

Bear  Creek,  near  Eastport  ....  and  also  the  con- 
nections at  Corinth,  Jackson,  and  Humboldt."  He 
was  instructed  to  "Avoid  any  general  engagement 

with  strong  forces better retreat  than  to  risk 

a  general  battle. ' ' 15  Two  days  later,  General  Hal- 
leek  sent  to  the  General-in-Chief  the  complaint 
against  General  Grant,  which  resulted  in  the  latter 's 
practical  suspension  from  active  command,  Halleck 
suggesting  at  the  same  time  that  General  C.  F. 
Smith  command  the  expedition  up  the  Tennessee. 
In  response  to  Halleck 's  complaint,  he  was  author- 
ized to  put  General  Grant  under  arrest,  "if  the  good 
of  the  service  requires  it",  to  which  Halleck  replied : 
"I  do  not  deem  it  advisable  to  arrest  him  at  pres- 
ent '  V6  On  the  fourth  of  March,  Halleck  dispatched 
to  Grant:  "You  will  place  Maj.  Gen.  C.  F.  Smith 
in  command  of  expedition  and  remain  yourself  at 
Fort  Henry. ' '  To  this,  Grant  replied,  on  the  next 
day:  "Troops  will  be  sent,  under  command  of 
Major-General  Smith,  as  directed.  I  had  prepared 
a  different  plan,  intending  General  Smith  to  com- 
mand the  forces  which  will  go  to  Paris  and  Hum- 
boldt, while  I  would  command  the  expedition  upon 
Eastport,  Corinth,  and  Jackson  in  person."  He 
then  assures  General  Halleck  that  instructions  will 
be  carried  out  "to  the  very  best"  of  his  ability.17 

Under  this  order  of  his  superior,  General  Grant 
remained  at  Fort  Henry,  acting  in  the  capacity  of 


30  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

a  forwarding-officer,  until  the  17th  of  the  month 
—  the  most  important  two  weeks  between  the  date  of 
the  order  to  proceed  up  the  Tennessee  and  the  6th 
of  April  following,  when  the  camp  was  attacked  at 
Pittsburg  Landing.  The  expedition  was  planned 
without  consultation  with  General  Grant,  com- 
mander of  the  district,  and  it  was  directed,  except 
in  minor  details,  from  headquarters  in  St.  Louis 
both  before  and  after  March  17th  —  the  date  of 
General  Grant's  restoration  to  active  command  of 
the  army  in  the  field. 

The  expedition  left  Fort  Henry  on  March  9th 
under  command  of  General  Smith,  with  full  author- 
ity from  the  Department  commander  to  select  the 
place  of  landing.18  General  Smith  established  head- 
quarters at  Savannah,  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river, 
but  sent  one  division  (General  Lew.  Wallace)  five 
miles  farther  up  to  Crump's  Landing  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  river,  where  his  division  went  into  camp 
on  the  12th.  On  the  13th  Wallace  sent  an  expedition 
west  about  fifteen  miles  to  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 
Railway  near  Bethel  station,  where  about  a  half- 
mile  of  trestle  work  was  destroyed.19  The  damage 
to  the  road  was  slight,  however,  as  repairs  were  soon 
made  (Map  I). 

On  the  14th  General  Smith  reported  that  he  had 
"not  been  able  to  get  anything  like  the  desired  infor- 
mation as  to  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  but  it  seems 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  31 

to  be  quoted  at  50,000  to  60,000  from  Jackson 
through  Corinth  and  farther  east. ' '  It  was  this  in- 
formation that  induced  General  Smith  "not  to 
attempt  to  cut  the  communication  at  that  place, 
[Corinth]  as  that  would  inevitably  lead  to  a  colli- 
sion in  numbers"  that  he  was  "ordered  to  avoid".20 
Immediately  after  this  report  was  made,  General 
Sherman  was  ordered  with  his  division  to  a  point 
some  distance  above  Pittsburg  Landing,  with  in- 
structions to  cut  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  road, 
if  possible,  at  some  point  east  of  Corinth.  The 
attempt  failed  on  account  of  high  water  and  Sher- 
man dropped  back  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  where  he 
met  Hurlbut's  division  sent  up  by  General  Smith  as 
support  in  case  of  need.  The  two  divisions  left  the 
boats  at  Pittsburg  Landing  and  went  into  camp. 
General  Sherman  sent  out  a  strong  reconnoitering 
force  toward  Corinth,  and  on  the  17th  he  reported 
to  General  Smith:  "I  am  satisfied  wre  cannot 
reach  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Road  without  a 
considerable  engagement,  which  is  prohibited  by 
General  Halleck's  instructions,  so  that  I  will  be 
governed  by  your  orders  of  yesterday  to  occupy 
Pittsburg  strongly."21 

General  Lew.  Wallace,  whose  division  was  at 
Crump's  Landing  at  this  time,  says  in  his  Autobio- 
graphy that  if  General  Smith  had  received  the  or- 
der from  Halleck  that  he  expected,  to  move  directly 


32  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

on  Corinth,  "  there  had  been  no  battle  of  Shiloh." 
And  again  he  says  that  by  the  time  General  Grant 
was  restored  to  command,  the  opportunity  of  ad- 
vancing on  Corinth  was  "going,  if  not  already 
gone".22 

General  Grant  was  restored  to  active  command 
on  March  17th,  and  going  at  once  to  General  Smith's 
headquarters  at  Savannah  he  reported  on  the  18th 
the  distribution  of  troops  as  he  found  it  —  three 
divisions  on  the  west  side  of  the  Tennessee,  Sher- 
man and  Hurlbut  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  Lew. 
Wallace  at  Crump 's  Landing ;  at  Savannah,  on  the 
east  side  of  the  river  was  McClernand's  division; 
and  on  transports  on  the  river,  waiting  for  orders, 
were  several  regiments  which  were  ordered  to  Pitts- 
burg  Landing.  It  is  important  to  remember  this 
distribution  of  the  army  as  General  Grant  found  it, 
under  the  sanction  if  not  the  direct  order  of  the  De- 
partment commander.  That  General  Halleck  still 
believed  it  possible  to  cut  the  Memphis  and  Charles- 
ton Kailroad,  according  to  his  original  plan,  is 
shown  by  a  dispatch  to  General  Grant  (March  18th) 
based  on  a  rumor  to  the  effect  that  the  enemy  had 
moved  from  Corinth  to  attack  the  line  of  the  Ten- 
nessee below  Savannah,  that  is,  to  attack  Grant's 
communications.  "If  so,"  says  General  Halleck, 
"General  Smith  should  immediately  destroy  rail- 
road connections  at  Corinth."23  To  this  General 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  33 

Grant  replied  on  the  19th:  "Immediate  prepara- 
tions will  be  made  to  execute  your  ....  order.  I 
will  go  in  person".24  Again,  on  the  next  day  in  a 
lengthy  dispatch  to  Halleck 's  Adjutant  General, 
Grant  repeated  his  intention  to  go  "in  person"  with 
the  expedition  "should  no  orders  received  hereafter 
prevent  it"  —  adding  that  he  would  "take  no  risk 
....  under  the  instructions"  which  he  already  had ; 
that  if  a  battle  seemed  to  be  inevitable,  he  could 
"make  a  movement  upon  some  other  point  of  the 
railroad  ....  and  thus  save  the  demoralizing  effect 
of  a  retreat".25 

General  Halleck  evidently  thought  there  was 
special  significance  in  Grant's  intention  to  "go  in 
person"  with  the  expedition  toward  Corinth  —  he 
knew  something  would  be  doing  —  so,  on  the  20th 
Halleck  dispatched :  "keep  your  forces  together  un- 
til you  connect  with  General  Buell  ....  Don't  let 
the  enemy  draw  you  into  an  engagement  now." 

Before  this  last  dispatch  was  received,  orders 
were  issued  by  General  Grant  to  all  division  com- 
manders to  hold  themselves  ready  to  march  at  a 
moment's  notice,  with  three  days'  rations  in  haver- 
sacks and  seven  days'  rations  in  wagons.  On  re- 
ceiving the  "wait"  order,  Grant  dispatched  again 
(March  21):  "Corinth  cannot  be  taken  without 
meeting  a  large  force,  say  30,000.  A  general  en- 
gagement would  be  inevitable ;  therefore  I  will  wait 


34  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

a  few  days  for  further  instructions. ' ' 27  Evidently 
General  Grant  was  restive  and  anxious,  believing 
that  precious  time  was  going  to  waste,  as  appears 
from  what  he  wrote  to  General  Smith:  "the  sooner 
we  attack  the  easier  will  be  the  task".28 

As  far  as  the  records  show,  no  orders  later  than 
March  20th  were  received  by  General  Grant ;  and  so 
the  army  within  striking  distance  of  the  enemy  was 
in  a  state  of  suspended  animation  for  nearly  three 
weeks.  The  army  was  expected  to  cut  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  road,  but  it  was  not  permitted  to 
fight  for  the  purpose ;  it  must  do  it  without  disturb- 
ing the  enemy. 

It  is  important  to  remember  in  this  connection 
that  the  territory  west  of  the  Tennessee  River,  from 
near  its  mouth  southward  to  Pittsburg  Landing 
and  west  to  the  Mississippi,  was  the  enemy's  coun- 
try both  in  sentiment  and  by  strong  military  occu- 
pation, and  so  the  expedition  under  General  Smith 
up  the  Tennessee  was  moving  fully  two  hundred 
miles  from  its  base  of  supplies,  wholly  dependent 
upon  the  river.  This  territory  was  well  supplied 
with  railroads  under  control  of  the  enemy,  by  means 
of  which,  if  so  disposed,  he  might  throw  a  strong 
force  on  short  notice  against  General  Smith's  com- 
munications. General  Grant  evidently  had  this 
danger  in  mind  when  replying  to  General  Halleck's 
order  sending  the  expedition  up  the  river,  as  already 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  35 

quoted.  But  in  this  as  in  other  things,  General 
Grant's  advice  was  not  sought  and  his  suggestions 
were  not  heeded.  The  conditions  at  Pittsburg 
Landing  were  not  of  his  making  —  they  were  ac- 
cepted as  they  were  found,  even  after  three  re- 
quests to  be  relieved  of  command  in  the  Depart- 
ment, because  of  the  strained  relations  between  his 
superior  and  himself.29 

GENERAL  BUELL'S  MOVEMENTS 

In  pursuance  of  his  plan  after  Nashville,  to  fol- 
low the  enemy  south,  on  March  10th,  General  Buell 
reported  his  advance  at  Columbia,  Tennessee,  at  the 
crossing  of  Duck  River.30  The  consolidation  of  the 
two  Departments  occurred  on  the  llth,  and  on  the 
13th,  General  Halleck,  as  if  in  some  degree  appre- 
ciating General  Buell's  embarrassment,  wrote  him 
as  follows :  "The  new  arrangement  of  departments 
will  not  interfere  with  your  command.  You  will 
continue  in  command  of  the  same  army  and  dis- 
trict of  country  as  heretofore,  so  far  as  I  am  con- 
cerned."31 Definite  orders  to  General  Buell  soon 
followed  the  consolidation;  March  16th:  "Move 
your  forces  by  land  to  the  Tennessee  ....  Grant's 
army  is  concentrating  at  Savannah."  Again  on 
March  20th : i  i  important  that  you  communicate  with 
General  Smith  as  soon  as  possible."  And  again  on 


36  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

March  29th :  '  *  You  will  concentrate  all  your  avail- 
able troops  at  Savannah,  or  Pittsburg,  12  miles 
above."32 

As  already  stated,  General  Buell  had  one  division 
at  Columbia  —  about  forty  miles  on  the  road  to 
Savannah  —  when  the  order  came  to  join  Grant. 
The  remainder  of  the  army  moved  promptly,  but 
was  detained  at  the  crossing  of  Duck  River  in  build- 
ing a  bridge  until  the  30th,  though  one  division 
(Nelson's)  waded  the  river  on  the  29th. 

Naturally  General  Grant,  in  front  of  a  rapidly 
concentrating  army  under  General  Johnston  and 
General  Beauregard,  was  anxious  to  know  of  Gen- 
eral Buell 's  movements,  and  so,  two  days  after  as- 
suming active  command,  two  couriers  were  started 
from  Savannah  for  BuelPs  camp  which  was  reached 
on  the  23d  with  this  dispatch  from  Grant:  "I  am 
massing  troops  at  Pittsburg,  Tennessee.  There  is 
every  reason  to  suppose  that  the  rebels  have  a  large 
force  at  Corinth,  Miss.,  and  many  at  other  points 
on  the  road  toward  Decatur. " 33  Thus  General  Buell 
had  positive  knowledge  both  from  General  Halleck 
and  General  Grant  that  the  latter  was  "massing 
troops"  at  Pittsburg  Landing  —  and  this  informa- 
tion was  in  possession  of  General  Buell  a  full  week 
before  his  army  was  able  to  cross  Duck  River  (about 
90  miles  away)  and  two  weeks  before  the  battle. 
This  point  is  dwelt  upon  for  the  reason  that  cer- 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  37 

tain  writers  have  erroneously  claimed  that  General 
Buell  had  not  been  informed  of  General  Grant's 
position  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee  and 
hence  did  not  press  his  march. 

After  wading  Duck  River  as  stated,  General  Nel- 
son's division  went  into  camp  for  the  night,  and 
took  up  the  march  next  morning  (the  30th)  reach- 
ing Savannah  about  noon,  April  5th,  having 
marched  an  average  of  twelve  miles  a  day.34  Gen- 
eral Buell  arrived  in  Savannah  "about  sundown", 
on  the  same  day,  but  he  did  not  make  his  presence 
known,  nor  was  his  presence  known  to  General 
Grant,  when  the  latter,  with  his  staff,  took  boat  next 
morning  for  the  battle  field  after  an  "  early  break- 
fast" left  unfinished. 

It  need  not  be  matter  of  surprise  that  General 
Buell  should  be  reluctant  to  join  his  army  of  about 
equal  strength  and  independent  in  command  with 
the  army  on  the  Tennessee.  It  was  Buell 's  wish  to 
strike  the  Tennessee  higher  up  and  conduct  a  cam- 
paign of  his  own.  With  this  in  mind  he  suggested 
to  General  Halleck  that  he  [Buell]  be  permitted  to 
halt  and  go  into  camp  about  thirty  miles  east  of 
Savannah,  at  Waynesboro.  To  this  suggestion  Gen- 
eral Halleck  replied  on  the  5th:  "You  are  right 
about  concentrating  at  Waynesborough.  Future 
movements  must  depend  upon  those  of  the  enemy. '  *35 
General  Buell  issued  orders  to  "concentrate",  but 


38  THE   BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

fortunately  Ms  advance  had  passed  the  point  desig- 
nated before  the  orders  were  delivered,  and  the 
march  continued.  Had  it  been  otherwise  the  reen- 
forcing  army  would  have  been  forty  miles  away, 
instead  of  its  advance  division  being  within  ten 
miles,  when  the  battle  began. 

It  may  be  asked:  Why  did  not  General  Buell 
make  his  presence  in  Savannah  known  to  General 
Grant  promptly  on  arrival  ?  Perhaps  a  perfectly 
just  answer  cannot  be  given  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
the  former  was  not  required  to  " report"  to  the 
latter  as  a  subordinate  to  a  superior  —  the  one  was 
to  join  the  other  and  wait  for  orders  from  a  higher 
source  than  either.  There  was  but  one  contingency 
under  which  any  part  of  General  Buell's  army  could 
come  under  General  Grant's  orders  —  an  attack 
upon  the  latter.  General  Halleck's  instructions  to 
General  Grant  were  (April  5th)  :  "You  will  act  in 
concert,  but  he  [Buell]  will  exercise  his  separate 
command,  unless  the  enemy  should  attack  you.  In 
that  case  you  are  authorized  to  take  the  general 
command."36  The  contingency  arose  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  6th. 

BEFOBE  THE  BATTLE 

From  the  date  of  General  Halleck's  "wait"  or- 
der to  the  date  of  the  battle  —  that  is  from  March 
20th  to  April  6th  —  there  were  fifteen  full  days,  dur- 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  39 

ing  which  time  this  positive  order  was  in  force: 
"My  instructions  not  to  advance  must  be  obeyed." 
Nothing,  therefore,  remained  but  to  watch  the  en- 
emy and  dodge  him  in  case  he  offered  battle  in  any 
considerable  force.  There  was  scarcely  a  day  in 
that  waiting  time  in  which  there  was  not  recon- 
noitering,  resulting  in  several  light  encounters. 
Colonel  Buckland,  commanding  the  fourth  brigade 
of  General  Sherman's  division,  has  given  a  good  ac- 
count of  the  condition  of  things  at  the  front  during 
the  three  or  four  days  before  the  battle  in  a  paper 
read  before  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennes- 
see in  1881  and  published  in  the  Proceedings  of  the 
Society.37 

On  Thursday,  April  3d,  three  days  before  the 
battle  and  the  day  on  which  the  Confederates 
marched  from  Corinth  and  surrounding  camps, 
Colonel  Buckland  under  orders  of  the  division  com- 
mander reconnoitered  four  or  five  miles  toward 
Corinth,  finding  the  enemy  in  such  force  as  to  deter 
him  from  attack,  in  view  of  the  order  to  "fall  back" 
rather  than  risk  bringing  on  a  general  engagement. 
The  brigade  marched  back  without  an  encounter. 
On  the  next  day  the  picket  line  was  attacked  in  front 
of  Buckland 's  brigade,  and  a  picket  post  was  cap- 
tured, consisting  of  a  Lieutenant  and  seven  men. 
Colonel  Buckland  went  out  with  a  regiment  to  inves- 
tigate and  had  two  of  his  companies  surrounded  by 


40  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

Confederate  cavalry,  which  was  in  turn  surprised 
and  routed  by  the  reinforcements  sent  to  the  relief 
of  the  two  companies.  Just  as  the  enemy  appeared 
to  be  forming  for  a  counter  attack  on  Buckland,  the 
Fifth  Ohio  cavalry  of  Sherman's  division  came  up, 
attacked  and  routed  the  enemy,  capturing  several 
prisoners.  This  affair  developed  the  presence  of 
the  enemy  in  considerable  force  —  infantry,  caval- 
ry, and  artillery.  When  Colonel  Buckland  reached 
the  picket  line,  on  his  return  to  camp,  he  found 
General  Sherman  with  several  regiments  awaiting 
him  and  wanting  to  know,  with  a  show  of  displeas- 
ure, what  he  had  been  doing  out  in  front.  After 
hearing  Colonel  Buckland 's  account  of  the  matter, 
he  was  ordered  back  to  camp  with  his  men,  General 
Sherman  accompanying  the  order  with  the  remark 
that  he  might  have  brought  on  a  general  engage- 
ment, which  is  to  be  understood  as  a  mild  reprimand. 

So  particular  was  General  Sherman  to  avoid  cen- 
sure that  he  required  Colonel  Buckland  to  make  a 
written  report  of  the  incident  which  report  was  sent 
to  General  Grant. 

Colonel  Buckland  further  says  that  he  was  along 
the  picket  line  several  times  on  Saturday,  the  day 
before  the  battle,  and  saw  the  enemy  at  several 
points,  and  that  the  pickets  reported  activity  near 
the  lines.  Other  officers  made  similar  observations. 
"It  was  the  belief  of  all",  says  Colonel  Buckland, 


THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH  41 

' 'that  the  enemy  intended  to  attack  us,  either  dur- 
ing the  night  or  early  in  the  morning '  '.38  This  feel- 
ing was  so  strong  that  regimental  officers  were  in- 
structed to  have  their  commands  in  readiness  for 
attack  —  the  picket  line  was  strengthened  and  a 
line  of  sentries  was  established  from  the  picket  line 
back  to  camp. 

Similar  evidence  as  to  the  activity  of  the  enemy 
on  Saturday  the  5th  is  furnished  by  Captain  I.  P. 
Rumsey,  a  staff  officer  of  General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace, 
who  was  riding  outside  the  lines  on  that  day.  On 
returning  to  camp  Captain  Rumsey  reported  to  Col- 
onel Dickey,  4th  Illinois  cavalry,  that  he  had  seen  a 
considerable  body  of  Confederate  cavalry.  The 
two  officers  going  to  General  Sherman's  headquar- 
ters, reported  the  facts,  to  which  General  Sherman 
replied :  "I  know  they  are  out  there,  but  our  hands 
are  tied ;  we  can 't  do  a  thing. ' '  Colonel  Dickey  then 
asked  permission  to  take  his  regiment  out  to  investi- 
gate, receiving  for  reply :  "  Dickey,  if  you  were  to 
go  out  there  with  your  regiment  you  would  bring- 
on  a  battle  in  less  than  an  hour,  and  we  have  positive 
orders  not  to  be  drawn  into  a  battle  until  Buell 


comes."39 


Colonel  McPherson,  Halleck's  chief  engineer, 
who  was  camping  with  the  second  division  (W.  H. 
L.  Wallace)  fully  corroborates  the  above  state- 


42  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

merits,  by  saying:  "It  was  well  known  the  enemy 
was  approaching  our  lines".40 

Apprehension  of  an  early  attack  upon  the  camp 
prevailed  among  the  subordinate  officers  of  General 
Prentiss's  division,  as  well  as  among  those  of  Gen- 
eral Sherman's  division,  and  similar  orders  were 
given  to  companies  and  regiments  to  be  prepared  for 
a  night  or  an  early  morning  attack.  And  it  seems 
now  to  be  well  settled  that  the  reconnoitering  party 
sent  out  from  Prentiss's  division  before  daylight  on 
Sunday  morning  was  sent  out  by  Colonel  Peabody 
of  the  25th  Missouri,  commanding  the  first  brigade 
of  the  division,  and  without  the  knowledge  of  Gen- 
eral Prentiss. 

In  the  history  of  the  25th  Missouri,  edited  and 
compiled  by  Dr.  W.  A.  Neal,  Assistant  Surgeon  of 
the  regiment,  and  published  in  1889,  appears  a  de- 
tailed account  of  the  action  of  Colonel  Peabody  on 
the  eve  of  the  battle,  as  related  by  Lieutenant  James 
M.  Newhard,  at  the  time  Orderly  Sergeant  of  Com- 
pany E,  25th  Missouri,  one  of  the  companies  in  the 
reconnoitering  party.  It  is  related  that  Colonel 
Peabody  urged  upon  General  Prentiss  on  Saturday 
the  5th  that  an  attack  was  very  probable  and  that 
preparation  ought  to  be  made  accordingly.  As 
nothing  was  done  except  to  strengthen  pickets  and 
guards  Colonel  Peabody,  under  the  influence  of  a 
premonition  that  an  attack  would  be  made  early  in 


THE   BATTLE   OF   SHILOH  43 

the  morning  and  that  he  would  not  survive  the  battle, 
decided  to  take  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of 
sending  out  a  party  to  reconnoiter.  So  Ma j  or  Pow- 
ell, an  officer  of  the  Regular  Army  and  Field  Officer 
of  the  Day  was  ordered  to  take  three  companies  of 
the  25th  Missouri,  start  at  about  3  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  and  march  until  he  found  the  enemy.  The 
companies  constituting  the  party  were  B,  H,  and  E, 
of  the  25th  Missouri.  How  and  where  the  enemy 
was  found  will  be  related  farther  on. 

Some  persons  will  have  doubts,  probably,  in  re- 
gard to  the  story  of  Colonel  Peabody  's  premonitions 
of  attack,  and  death  in  battle,  but  there  can  be  no 
doubt  about  the  attack,  or  about  the  death  of  Colonel 
Peabody,  within  a  few  minutes  after  the  main  bat- 
tle began.  Major  Powell  was  also  killed  early  in 
the  battle,  and  so  the  two  principal  actors  in  the  first 
scene  of  the  drama  passed  quickly  off  the  stage, 
but  not  until  after  the  chief  of  the  two  was  severely 
reprimanded,  at  the  head  of  his  brigade  in  line  and 
waiting  for  orders.  The  following  letter,  to  a 
nephew  of  Colonel  Peabody,  here  given  by  permis- 
sion, tells  the  story. 

333  Highland  Av. 
MR.  F.  E.  PEABODY,  SOMEBVILLE,  MASS.  Feby.  27th  1902 

Box  7  Boston. 
Dear  Sir: 

Referring  to  our  conversation  concerning  the  Battle  of 
Pittsburg  Landing,  Tennessee,  April  6  &  7,  1862,  I  have  to 


44  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

state  that:  Everett  Peabody,  Colonel  of  the  25th  Mo.  Vol. 
Inft.,  was  in  command  of  the  first  Brigade  6th  Division  and  I 
was  senior  Captain  of  the  regiment. 

At  early  morn  before  breakfast  the  line  of  Battle  was 
formed,  with  the  right  of  Brigade  resting  on  the  right  of  our 
regimental  color  line.  My  company  was  on  the  right  of  Bri- 
gade. A  few  minutes  after  the  line  was  formed,  General  Pren- 
tiss  rode  up  near  Colonel  Peabody,  who  was  mounted  and  in 
front  of  my  company,  about  the  center  of  the  first  platoon 
and  said  to  him, ' '  Colonel  Peabody,  I  hold  you  responsible  for 
bringing  on  this  fight. ' '  Saluting,  Colonel  Peabody  said :  "If 
I  brought  on  the  fight  I  am  able  to  lead  the  van."  General 
Prentiss  ordered  him  to  take  his  best  regiment  ....  the  next 
words  I  heard  were :  ' '  25th  Missouri,  forward. ' ' 
Signed  Yours  respectfully, 

P.  C.  NICHOLS, 

Captain  U.  S.  Army,  Retired; 

formerly  Major  &  Capt.  25th  Mo. 

Vol.  Inf.  War  of  '61  &  5. 

This  letter  by  Capt.  Nichols  makes  clear  and  pos- 
itive two  important  points:  (1)  that  General  Pren- 
tiss, like  General  Sherman,  was  impressed  with  the 
idea  that,  under  General  Halleck's  orders  the  en- 
emy was  to  be  avoided  rather  than  sought  out,  and 
he  reprimanded  his  brigade  commander  for  doing, 
irregularly,  the  very  thing  that  saved  the  army 
from  the  "surprise"  about  which  so  many  un- 
truths have  been  told;  (2)  the  letter  makes  it  clear 
that  Prentiss 's  division  was  neither  in  bed  nor  at 
breakfast,  when  the  attack  came  —  it  was  in  line 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  45 

" before  breakfast",  and  the  enemy  was  received 
with  a  hot  fire,  as  will  appear. 

Prentiss's  reprimand  of  Colonel  Peabody  was, 
doubtless,  prompted  by  the  same  sense  of  responsi- 
bility as  was  that  administered  by  General  Sher- 
man to  Colonel  Buckland,  already  mentioned.  It 
had  been  "ground  into"  each  division  commander, 
so  to  speak,  that,  "in  no  case"  were  they  "to  be 
drawn  into  an  engagement." 

There  was  another  incident  in  the  activities  im- 
mediately preceding  the  battle,  more  important 
than  anything  yet  mentioned,  which,  however,  was 
not  revealed,  until  forty  years  later  —  an  incident 
which,  had  it  been  known  when  and  by  whom  it 
should  have  been  known,  the  Battle  of  Shiloh  would 
have  had  a  different  story  to  tell.  We  now  know, 
though  the  knowledge  is  comparatively  recent  but 
entirely  reliable,  that  General  Lew.  Wallace,  com- 
manding the  second  division  of  the  army  at  Crump 's 
Landing,  had  positive  information  of  the  movement 
of  the  Confederate  army  to  attack  Grant  on  the  very 
day  that  the  movement  began  —  information 
brought  directly  to  him  by  one  trusted  scout  and 
confirmed  by  a  second.  During  two  full  days  and 
three  nights  ("for  three  days  and  nights,"  to  quote 
his  language)  he  "simmers"  this  all-important  in- 
formation in  his  mind,  trying  to  determine  how  he 


46  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

could  best  reenf orce  the  comrades  beyond  Snake 
Creek  in  case  of  need. 

General  Wallace  tells  in  his  Autobiography  how 
and  when  the  information  came  to  him  of  the  move- 
ment of  the  Confederate  army  from  Corinth  as 
follows : 

"About  as  the  sun  set,  Thursday,  the  4th  [3d], 
Bell  the  scout  came  into  my  tent,  evidently  the  worse 
for  a  hard  ride,  and  said,  abruptly,  'I  bring  you 

news,  sir The  whole  rebel  army  is  on  the  way  up 

from  Corinth. .  .  .  They  set  out  this  morning  early. 
By  this  time  they  are  all  on  the  road  ....  batteries 
and  all. '  This  important  information  was  confirm- 
ed by  another  scout  (Carpenter)  :  'Johnston's  cut 
loose  and  is  making  for  Pittsburg. ' ; 

General  Wallace  says  that  he  sent  this  informa- 
tion by  his  orderly,  on  the  same  evening  to  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  with  instructions  in  case  Grant  was 
not  found  to  leave  the  dispatch  with  the  postmas- 
ter, to  be  delivered  next  morning.  General  Wal- 
lace's excuse  for  not  sending  a  proper  officer  with 
positive  orders  to  find  Grant,  seems  almost  too 
puerile  to  be  credited  —  he  did  not  want  to  appear 
' '  officious ' '.  The  dispatch  never  reached  its  proper 
destination,  and  the  secret  was  in  the  keeping  of 
General  Wallace  until  he  disclosed  it  in  his  Autobio- 
graphy. For  Ms  own  reputation,  it  might  better 
have  died  with  him.  A  dispatch  boat  was  at  all 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH  47 

times  at  Wallace's  headquarters,  subject  to  his  or- 
ders, and  there  should  have  been  no  difficulty  in  the 
way  of  finding  General  Grant  within  two  hours, 
whether  at  the  Landing  above  or  at  Savannah  below. 
It  is  worth  remembering  in  this  connection  that  the 
orderly  sent  with  this  dispatch  went  by  the  river 
road  and  over  Snake  Creek  bridge  which  had  been 
repaired  on  that  very  day  under  direction  of  Colonel 
McPherson,  Halleck's  chief  engineer.  General 
Wallace  pleaded  ignorance  of  this  road,  two  days 
later,  in  excusing  himself  for  marching  his  division 
over  the  wrong  road. 

THE  UNION  ARMY  AND  THE  FIELD 

To  understand  and  properly  appreciate  the  diffi- 
culties under  which  the  Battle  of  Shiloh  was  fought 
on  the  Union  side,  the  composition  of  the  Army  and 
the  topography  of  the  field  must  both  be  considered. 
The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  as  it  was  camped  in  the 
woods  above  Pittsburg  Landing  on  Sunday  morn- 
ing, April  6, 1862,  was  never  in  a  camp  of  organiza- 
tion and  instruction,  as  an  Army  —  it  grew  by  accre- 
tion, beginning  at  Fort  Donelson  in  the  middle  of 
February  preceding.  Some  of  the  regiments  that 
stormed  the  enemy's  works  at  Donelson  dropped 
into  line  for  the  first  time  under  fire,  and  only  a  few 
hours  before  the  assault  was  made.  In  like  manner 
new  and  untrained  regiments  and  batteries  came, 


48  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

one  by  one,  to  swell  the  ranks  at  Shiloh,  even  after 
the  roar  of  battle  sounded  through  the  woods,  tak- 
ing their  assigned  places  under  fire.  The  division 
(Prentiss's  6th)  from  which  the  reconnoitering 
party  went  out  before  daylight  on  Sunday  morning 
to  " surprise"  the  enemy  was  the  newest  of  the  new, 
having  but  two  organized  brigades  —  though  there 
was  enough  "raw  material"  assigned  to  the  divi- 
sion for  a  third  brigade,  not  all  on  the  ground,  how- 
ever, when  the  battle  began.  Attention  is  called  to 
these  facts  for  the  reason  that  they  should  be  taken 
into  account  in  passing  judgment  upon  the  Battle 
of  Shiloh. 

X  Besides  the  lack  of  organization  and  drill  of  the 
army  the  character  of  the  field  upon  which  the  bat- 
tle was  fought  should  be  considered.  It  has  been 
said  with  much  truth  that  a  clear  understanding  of 
the  Battle  of  Shiloh  cannot  be  had  without  studying 
the  movements  on  the  ground.  A  written  descrip- 
tion can  convey  only  a  very  general  idea  of  the 
plateau  upon  which  the  battle  was  fought ;  hence  a 
map  showing  the  principal  streams,  roads,  open 
fields,  etc.,  is  added  to  aid  the  study  of  the  positions 
and  movements  (Map  II). 

The  plateau,  rising  eighty  to  one  hundred  feet 
above  the  Tennessee  on  the  east,  was  surrounded 
by  almost  impassable  barriers  on  all  sides  —  except 
an  opening  to  the  southwest,  two  and  a  half  to  three 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  49 

miles  in  width.  The  plateau  sheds  its  waters  west, 
north,  and  east  —  west  and  northwest  into  Owl 
Creek;  north  into  Snake  Creek;  and  east  into  the 
Tennessee.  The  creeks  were  effectually  guarded 
by  swampy  margins  and  heavy  timber,  or  by  a  com- 
bination of  the  three  —  timber,  under-brush,  and 
swamp.  They  admitted  of  no  crossing  except  by 
bridges,  of  which  there  was  one  on  each  of  the 
streams  leading  to  and  from  the  battle  field.  The 
Tennessee  could  be  crossed  only  by  boat,  as  the  army 
had  never  been  supplied  with  pontoons. 

This  plateau,  bordered  as  described,  was  cut  into 
numerous  gullies  and  ravines  by  small  spring- 
branches,  running  to  all  points  of  the  compass  in 
finding  their  tortuous  ways  to  the  larger  streams. 
Most  of  these  spring-branches  ran  through  marshy 
ground  —  impassable  in  the  early  spring  except 
where  bridged.  Some  of  the  ravines  were  deep, 
miry,  and  so  densely  choked  with  briers  and  bram- 
bles as  to  defy  invasion  by  anything  much  larger 
than  a  rabbit.  The  hillsides  and  the  ridges  were 
covered  with  timber  and  underbrush,  except  where 
small  farms  were  under  cultivation.  There  was  not  x 
an  elevation  anywhere  on  the  three  miles  square 
from  which  a  general  view  could  be  had.  Wide 
flanking  movements  were  impossible  to  either  army, 
and  cavalry  was  practically  useless.  The  Landing 
itself  was  a  mud  bank  at  the  foot  of  a  steep  bluff,  a 


50  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

single  road  winding  around  the  bluff  and  up  the 
hillside  to  higher  ground.  At  a  distance  of  about  a 
half-mile  from  the  Landing  the  road  forked  and  a 
little  further  on  struck  the  Hamburg  and  Savannah 
road,  running  nearly  parallel  with  the  river.  Still 
further  on  the  Corinth  road  crossed  the  Hamburg 
and  Purdy  road  and  struck  the  Bark  road,  one 
branch  three  miles  out  and  the  other  branch  four 
miles  out.  Besides  these  main  roads  shown  on  the 
map,  there  were  numerous  farm  roads  winding 
around  on  the  ridges,  and  the  needs  of  the  army 
made  many  new  roads  —  all  were  deep  in  mud  made 
of  the  most  tenacious  clay,  so  that  the  unloading  of 
boats  and  the  hauling  to  camp  was  a  slow  and  labor- 
ious process  for  both  man  and  mule. 

Had  John  Codman  Ropes  understood  the  topog- 
raphy and  other  conditions  of  the  field  of  Shiloh, 
he  would  hardly  have  ventured  to  criticise  General 
Johnston  for  making  a  front  attack  upon  the  com- 
mands of  Hurlbut,  Prentiss,  and  Wallace,  and  for 
failing  to  force  his  way  along  the  Hamburg  and 
Savannah  road  on  the  Union  left  at  an  earlier  hour. 
General  Johnston  had  no  choice  but  to  make  a  front 
attack  and  he  did  his  best  to  force  his  way  along  the 
Hamburg  and  Savannah  road,  toward  the  Landing 
at  the  earliest  possible  hour.  Why  and  how  he  failed 
to  accomplish  his  main  object,  before  the  close  of  the 
day,  will  appear  later.  The  ground  between  the 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  51 

Hamburg  and  Savannah  road  and  the  river  was 
much  broken  —  so  much  so  that  there  were  but  two 
or  three  cultivated  fields  on  that  part  of  the  plateau. 

THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY  AND  ITS  OBJECTIVE 

As  already  stated,  after  the  surrender  of  Fort 
Donelson  and  the  evacuation  of  Nashville  General 
Johnston's  army  fell  back  as  rapidly  as  possible 
southward  to  the  line  of  the  Memphis  and  Charles- 
ton Railroad  with  a  view  to  joining  General  Beaure- 
gard,  who  commanded  the  territory  west  of  the 
Tennessee  River  with  headquarters  at  Corinth.  By 
the  last  week  in  March  there  had  been  concentrated 
at  Corinth  and  in  the  vicinity  an  army  of  40,000 
effective  men,  and  General  Johnston  took  command 
on  the  29th  of  March  with  General  Beauregard  sec- 
ond in  command.  The  object  to  be  accomplished  by 
this  army  was  to  attack  and  defeat  Grant 's  army  be- 
fore the  arrival  of  Buell,  then  on  the  march  from 
Nashville  with  37,000  men,  following  up  this  antici- 
pated success  with  the  defeat  of  Buell,  thus  opening 
the  way  back  to  Nashville  so  recently  evacuated.  The 
movement  from  Corinth  and  surrounding  camps  to 
attack  Grant  began  in  the  early  morning  of  April 
3d,  with  a  view  to  making  the  attack  early  on  the 
5th.  Bad  weather  and  bad  roads  delayed  the  attack 
twenty-four  hours  —  to  Sunday  morning,  April  6th. 


52  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

How  the  expected  " surprise"  of  Grant's  army  was 
anticipated  will  now  be  told. 

THE  BATTLE 

It  is  not  the  purpose  to  describe  in  detail  the  move- 
ments of  the  battle  throughout  the  two  days,  but 
only  to  touch  upon  salient  features.  One  of  the 
salient  features,  and  not  the  least  important,  is  that 
of  the  action  of  the  reconnoitering  party  heretofore 
referred  to  as  having  been  sent  out  before  daylight 
on  Sunday  morning  from  Prentiss  's  division.  Gen- 
eral Prentiss  in  his  official  report  makes  no  men- 
tion of  the  Powell  party,  but  he  says  that  "at  3 
o'clock  ....  Col.  David  Moore,  Twenty-first  Mis- 
souri, with  five  companies  of  his  infantry  regiment, 
proceeded  to  the  front,  and  at  break  of  day  the  ad- 
vance pickets  were  driven  in".42 

Colonel  Moore,  in  his  official  report,  says  that  he 
was  ordered  out  by  Colonel  Peabody,  commanding 
the  First  Brigade,  "at  about  6  o'clock",  to  support 
the  picket  guard  which  "had  been  attacked  and 
driven  in".  It  appears  to  be  certain,  therefore, 
that  both  the  reconnoitering  party  under  Major 
Powell  and  the  support  under  Colonel  Moore  were 
ordered  out  by  Colonel  Peabody  without  consulting 
the  division  commander ;  hence  the  reprimand  above 
quoted  —  heard  and  remembered  by  many  others 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  53 

besides  Captain  Nichols.  Colonel  Moore 's  command 
was  a  reenforcing  not  a  reconnoitering  party. 

The  line  of  march  of  the  Powell  party  may  be 
traced  on  the  map  (No.  II)  along  the  road  passing 
the  camp  of  the  25th  Missouri,  past  the  southeast 
corner  of  Rhea  Field  and  the  north  side  of  Seay 
Field,  passing  the  picket  line  at  the  forks  of  the  road 
and  striking  the  corner  of  Fraley  Field  a  few  rods 
farther  on.  From  this  point  the  videttes  of  the  Con- 
federate picket,  under  Major  Hardcastle  of  Har- 
dee's  corps  were  encountered.  The  videttes  fired 
upon  the  advancing  party  and  retired  to  the  picket 
line  at  the  southwest  corner  of  Fraley  Field.  The 
fight  between  the  picket  post  and  Powell's  party 
began  at  once,  though  it  was  still  quite  dark  —  "too 
dark  to  see,  in  the  timber  and  underbrush",  so  the 
firing  at  first  was  at  random.  As  there  never  was 
an  official  report  made  of  the  part  taken  by  the 
Powell  reconnoitering  party,  as  both  the  officer 
ordering  it  out  and  the  officer  commanding  it  were 
killed  early  in  the  main  battle,  we  must  rely  upon 
the  report  of  the  officer  commanding  the  Confeder- 
ate picket  at  Fraley  Field  for  the  incidents  of  that 
encounter.  Ma j  or  Hardcastle  says  the  firing  began 
' t about  dawn "  (at  4 :55  in  fact) ,  and  he  says :  ' '  We 
fought  the  enemy  an  hour  or  more  without  giving 
an  inch".  "At  about  6:30"  he  saw  the  brigade 
formed  behind  him  and  "fell  back".  The  casual- 


54  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

ties  in  Major  Hardcastle's  command  were  four 
killed  and  nineteen  wounded.43  The  casualties  in 
the  Powell  party  were  never  certainly  known. 

This  stubborn  picket  fight  seems  to  have  been 
something  of  a  "surprise"  to  at  least  one  of  the 
Confederate  generals.  General  Bragg,  command- 
ing the  second  line  of  attack,  says  in  his  official  re- 
port that  "the  enemy  did  not  give  us  time  to  discuss 
the  question  of  attack,  for  soon  after  dawn  he  com- 
menced a  rapid  musketry  fire  on  our  pickets."*4 
Major  Hardcastle,  commanding  this  picket  line, 
says :  * '  The  enemy  opened  a  heavy  fire  on  us  at  a 
distance  of  about  two  hundred  yards".45  That  the 
Confederate  line  was  not  ready  to  move  forward  at 
once  when  the  firing  began  appears  from  Major 
Hardcastle's  official  report.  He  says :  "At  about 
6 :30  a.  m.  I  saw  the  brigade  formed  in  my  rear  and 
fell  back. " 45  So  there  was  a  full  hour  and  a  half 
elapsed  between  the  beginning  of  the  firing  and  the 
movement  f orward.  The  battle  front,  two  and  a  half 
to  three  miles  in  extent  with  a  curtain  of  skirmish- 
ers, advanced  to  the  attack.  Major  Powell's  party 
and  the  Union  pickets  that  joined  him  fell  slowly 
back,  carrying  their  dead  and  wounded  until  they 
met  Colonel  Moore  with  five  companies  of  his  regi- 
ment (21st  Missouri).  Colonel  Moore  taking  com- 
mand, sent  back  for  the  other  five  companies  of  his 
regiment,  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Woodyard. 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  55 

The  force  now  consisted  of  the  21st  Missouri,  three 
companies  of  the  25th  Missouri,  four  companies  of 
the  16th  Wisconsin,  and  two  companies  of  the  12th 
Michigan  —  all  infantry.  This  force  formed  in 
Seay  Field  and  advanced  to  a  point  near  the  north- 
west corner  of  the  field,  where  the  Confederate 
skirmishers  were  encountered,  the  8th  and  9th  Ar- 
kansas (Map  III).  There  was  a  sharp  fight  at 
this  point  lasting  about  thirty  minutes,  in  which 
Colonel  Moore  was  severely  wounded.  Lieutenant 
Mann  of  the  same  regiment  was  wounded,  and  Cap- 
tain Saxe  (16th  Wisconsin)  was  killed  —  the  first 
Union  officer  killed  in  the  Battle  of  Shiloh. 

As  the  Confederates  advanced,  the  little  Union 
force  moved  slowly  back  across  Shiloh  Branch, 
forming  again  at  a  point  about  two  hundred  yards 
from  the  southeast  corner  of  Rhea  Field,  where 
the  remainder  of  Peabody's  brigade  was  in  line. 
This  position  was  held  from  a  half  hour  to  an  hour 
against  two  brigades  (Shaver's  and  Wood's). 
While  falling  back  in  line  from  this  point  Major 
King  (21st  Missouri)  was  mortally  wounded. 
Meantime,  General  Prentiss  had  formed  the  re- 
mainder of  his  division  (Miller's  brigade)  and  had 
advanced  about  eighty  rods  from  the  front  of  his 
camp  to  the  south  side  of  Spain  Field  (Map  III), 
where  he  was  joined  by  Peabody's  brigade,  Powell's 
party,  and  the  pickets.  The  division,  now  consist- 


56  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

ing  of  seven  regiments  and  two  batteries,  was  here 
attacked  by  four  brigades  —  Wood,  Shaver,  Glad- 
den, and  Chalmers  —  comprising  twenty  regiments 
and  three  batteries.  Against  this  tremendous  odds 
the  position  was  held  for  about  thirty  minutes,  when 
the  division  fell  back  to  the  line  of  the  camp  where 
another  stand  of  about  thirty  minutes  was  made,  the 
division  finally  retiring  at  about  nine  o'clock  — 
more  than  five  hours  after  the  reconnoitering  party 
marched  out.  Among  the  casualties  on  the  Union 
side  in  front  of  Prentiss's  division  were  Colonel 
Peabody  and  Major  Powell,  killed46;  and  on  the 
Confederate  side  General  Gladden  was  mortally 
wounded. 

There  is  ample  testimony  in  the  official  reports 
of  Confederate  officers  to  show  that  the  resistance 
met  by  their  several  commands  in  the  slow  advance 
from  the  picket  line  had  none  of  the  features  of  a 
sham  battle.  There  were  many  casualties  on  both 
sides  —  how  many  was  never  certainly  known. 
There  was  no  bayoneting  of  Union  men  on  their 
beds  in  their  tents  or  elsewhere.  Indeed  there  was 
never  any  foundation  for  such  stories  except  in  the 
imagination  of  sensational  newspaper  correspond- 
ents. And  it  is  further  to  be  stated  that  at  the  time 
when  the  lines  came  in  collision  at  the  front  —  about 
8  o'clock  —  every  regiment  in  the  camp,  three  miles 


THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH  57 

in  extent,  was  in  line  waiting  orders  or  was  march- 
ing toward  the  sound  of  battle. 

A  word  of  explanation  should  here  be  made  in 
regard  to  General  Sherman's  (5th)  division.  This 
division  was  the  first  to  go  into  camp  at  Pittsburg 
Landing,  and  the  necessities  of  the  situation  re- 
quired it  to  cover  three  important  approaches  from 
the  back  country  to  the  Landing ;  namely,  the  main 
Corinth  road ;  a  bridge  on  the  Hamburg  and  Purdy 
road  over  Owl  Creek ;  and  a  ford  over  Lick  Creek 
near  its  mouth  which  accommodated  travel  from 
Hamburg  both  to  Purdy  and  Savannah.  The  cross- 
ing of  Owl  Creek  was  about  three  miles  west  of  the 
Landing,  and  the  crossing  of  Lick  Creek  was  about 
the  same  distance  to  the  south  of  the  Landing ;  while 
the  Corinth  road  ran  southwest  nearly  midway  be- 
tween the  two  crossings.  General  Sherman  camped 
three  brigades  (1st,  3d,  and  4th)  to  occupy  the  Cor- 
inth road  at  Shiloh  meeting-house,  thus  covering 
Owl  Creek  bridge.  The  other  brigade  (Stuart's) 
camping  to  cover  Lick  Creek  crossing,  was  separat- 
ed from  the  division  by  a  little  more  than  one  mile, 
and  it  remained  separated  throughout  the  first  day's 
battle,  acting  independently  of  the  orders  of  the  divi- 
sion commander.  The  space  between  the  two  parts 
of  Sherman's  division  was  later  occupied  by  Gen- 
eral Prentiss's  (6th)  division  formed  of  new  regi- 
ments as  they  arrived.  When  reference  is  here- 


58  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

after  made  to  Sherman's  division,  in  the  action  of 
Sunday,  it  is  to  be  understood  that  Stuart's  brigade 
is  not  included  for  the  reasons  explained. 

Still  another  explanation  is  needed.  When  Gen- 
eral Sherman  first  went  into  camp  special  attention 
was  paid  to  the  selection  of  camping  sites  conven- 
ient to  good  water.  By  consulting  the  map  it  will 
be  seen  that  three  brigades  of  this  division  were 
camped  somewhat  irregularly,  the  left  brigade  be- 
ing out  of  line  with  the  other  brigades  and  also  out 
of  line  in  itself.  As  a  consequence  when  line  of 
battle  was  formed  on  Sunday  morning  it  was  not  a 
prolonged  line,  the  left  of  Hildebrand's  brigade 
being  well  forward  and  in  an  open  field  where  it 
was  peculiarly  exposed  to  the  force  of  the  first  onset 
to  which  it  quickly  yielded  as  will  be  seen. 

At  a  little  after  seven  o'clock,  and  after  line  of 
battle  had  been  formed,  General  Sherman  and  staff 
rode  to  the  left  of  his  division  in  Rhea  Field  for  a 
better  view  to  the  front;  and  while  there  in  front 
of  the  53d  Ohio  regiment  (  Col.  Appier)  the  Confed- 
erate skirmishers  opened  fire  from  the  brush  across 
Shiloh  Branch,  killing  the  general's  orderly.  At 
about  eight  o'clock,  looking  off  to  the  "left  front", 
there  were  seen  "the  glistening  bayonets  of  masses 
of  infantry",  and  then,  for  the  first  time,  General 
Sherman  was  convinced  that  "the  enemy  designed 
a  determined  attack."47  A  few  minutes  later  the 


THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH  59 

Confederate  advance  struck  Sherman's  left  under 
Colonel  Hildebrand,  and  Prentiss's  right  under  Col- 
onel Peabody.  How  Prentiss  's  division  met  the  at- 
tack has  already  been  stated.  How  Sherman 's  divi- 
sion met  it  will  now  be  shown. 

The  53d  Ohio,  exposed  as  has  been  explained,  and 
commanded,  unfortunately,  by  an  officer  whose 
nerve  deserted  him  at  the  critical  moment,  after 
firing  two  volleys,  became  demoralized  and  as  an 
organization  disappeared,  though  two  companies 
were  rallied  by  their  officers,  joined  other  organiza- 
tions and  staid  on  the  firing  line  throughout  the 
day.  Colonel  Appier  disappeared  from  the  field 
and  was  later  cashiered  for  cowardice. 

The  attack  on  Sherman's  left  and  center  by  Cle- 
burne's  brigade  of  Hardee's  corps  was  furious  and 
sustained  —  to  be  repulsed,  however,  with  heavy 
loss,  by  Buckland's  brigade  and  the  two  remaining 
regiments  of  Hildebrand 's  brigade.  Cleburne,  in 
his  official  report  of  this  affair,  says :  ' i  Everywhere 
his  musketry  and  artillery  at  short  range  swept  the 

open  spaces with  an  iron  storm  that  threatened 

certain  destruction  to  every  living  thing  that  would 

dare  to  cross  them Under  the  terrible  fire  much 

confusion  followed,  and  a  quick  and  bloody  repulse 
was  the  consequence."  *8 

One  of  Cleburne 's  regiments  (6th  Miss.)  lost 
three  hvindred  men,  killed  and  wounded,  out  of  425, 


60  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

and  his  brigade  soon  went  to  pieces.  A  second  as- 
sault was  made  by  Anderson's  brigade  of  Bragg 's 
corps  to  meet  a  similar  repulse.  A  third  assault 
was  made  by  two  brigades  of  Folk's  corps  (Bus- 
sell's  and  Johnson's)  joined  with  the  reorganized 
brigades  of  Cleburne  and  Anderson  and  assist- 
ed by  Wood  on  their  right.  This  assault  was  suc- 
cessful, forcing  Sherman  from  his  first  line  at 
about  ten  o'clock,  and  with  him  one  brigade  of 
McClernand  's  division  that  had  come  to  his  support 
on  the  left.  Sherman 's  right  brigade  (McDowell 's) 
was  not  involved  in  this  engagement  for  the  reason 
that  the  line  of  attack  crossed  its  front  diagonally 
without  bringing  it  into  action;  but  a  little  later 
Pond's  brigade,  from  the  extreme  left  of  Bragg 's 
corps,  appeared  in  McDowell's  front,  overlapping 
his  right  and  covering  Owl  Creek  bridge.  Orders 
were  then  given  to  fall  back  to  the  Purdy  road, 
and  McDowell's  camp  was  abandoned  without  a 
fight.  By  this  time  Hildebrand's  brigade  had  gone 
to  pieces  and  Hildebrand  himself  being  without  a 
command,  reported  to  General  McClernand  for 
staff  duty.  In  fact  this  first  assault  on  Sherman's 
line  fell  mainly  upon  a  single  brigade  (Buck- 
land's),  and  it  was  on  the  hillside  in  his  front 
where,  according  to  General  Lew.  Wallace,  there 
was  "a  pavement  of  dead  men",  after  the  fight  was 
over.  This  must  be  considered  one  of  the  conspicu- 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  61 

ous  features  of  Sunday's  battle.  Time  was  of  the 
utmost  importance,  to  enable  the  proper  formations 
in  distant  parts  of  the  camp.  The  needed  time  was 
secured  by  the  stubborn  fight  made  by  Sherman's 
division  on  its  first  line;  and  it  was  probably  this 
that  gained  for  General  Sherman,  in  the  minds  of 
some,  credit  for  saving  the  day. 

It  was  in  the  Confederate  plan  to  push  its  right 
east  to  the  river,  turn  the  Union  left,  seize  the  Land- 
ing, and  force  the  army  back  on  Owl  Creek  where 
it  was  expected  surrender  would  necessarily  follow. 
The  stubbornness  of  the  resistance  to  the  Confeder- 
ate left  delayed  the  movement  toward  the  river 
somewhat,  though  two  brigades  (Chalmers's  and 
Jackson's)  were  in  front  of  the  Union  left  near  the 
mouth  of  Lick  Creek,  very  soon  after  the  extreme 
right  fell  back  from  the  first  line.  To  meet  these 
two  brigades  of  nine  regiments  and  two  batteries, 
Colonel  Stuart  had  a  single  brigade  of  three  regi- 
ments without  artillery — and  one  of  these  regi- 
ments (71st  Ohio)  was  led  off  the  field  by  its 
colonel  soon  after  the  fight  began,  to  take  no  further 
part  in  the  day's  battle.  Colonel  Mason  was  later 
cashiered  for  his  conduct  at  Shiloh. 

The  two  remaining  regiments  of  this  brigade 
gave  a  good  account  of  themselves  (55th  Illinois 
and  54th  Ohio),  making  heroic  resistance  and  suf- 
fering severely  in  casualties.  There  are  those  who 


62  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

believe  that  the  fighting  on  the  extreme  left  by  this 
little  band  of  about  eight  hundred  men  without 
artillery  and  against  three  or  four  times  their  num- 
ber with  artillery  was  not  less  important  than  was 
the  fighting  on  the  extreme  right,  though  less  con- 
spicuous. This  movement  of  the  Confederate 
right  was  under  the  personal  direction  of  General 
Johnston,  and  upon  its  quick  success  depended  the 
success  of  the  battle  as  planned.  Before  eleven 
o'clock  the  battle  was  raging  from  right  to  left,  a 
distance  of  three  to  four  miles. 

As  has  been  already  stated,  by  the  time  that  the 
battle  was  fairly  on  at  the  front  every  regiment  in 
the  most  distant  parts  of  the  camp  was  in  line. 
McClernand  promptly  supported  Sherman,  and 
Hurlbut  also  sent  one  of  his  brigades  (Veatch's)  to 
that  part  of  the  field,  leading  his  two  remaining 
brigades  to  support  Prentiss.  Hurlbut,  meeting 
Prentiss 's  division  falling  back  in  disorder,  allowed 
the  men  to  drift  through  his  ranks,  then  formed 
line  at  the  Peach  Orchard,  facing  Lauman's  bri- 
gade west  and  Williams 's  brigade  south,  where  he 
met  first  the  attack  of  Chalmers's  and  Jackson's 
brigades  from  the  direction  of  Prentiss 's  aban- 
doned camp.  A  little  later  this  position  was  attacked 
by  the  brigades  of  Bowen,  Statham,  Stephens,  and 
Gladden  —  the  latter  officer,  however,  having  re- 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  63 

ceived  a  mortal  wound  in  front  of  Prentiss's  first 
line,  as  already  stated. 

C.  F.  Smith's  (2nd)  division,  now  commanded  by 
W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  camped  near  the  Landing,  and 
fully  three  miles  from  the  point  where  the  battle 
began,  was  in  line  by  eight  o'clock,  and  the  first 
brigade  of  four  regiments  (Colonel  Tuttle)  ad- 
vanced to  Duncan  Field  and  took  position  in  the 
" sunken  road"  -long  abandoned  as  useless,  but 
which  ere  nightfall  was  destined  to  become  famous 
for  desperate  fighting  against  odds  (Map  III). 
Of  the  second  brigade  (General  McArthur's)  one 
regiment  was  sent  to  the  right;  two  were  sent  to 
cover  Snake  Creek  bridge,  over  which  General 
Lew.  Wallace's  division  was  expected  at  an  early 
hour;  and  two  inarched  under  General  McArthur 
himself,  to  the  support  of  Stuart,  on  the  extreme 
left.  The  third  brigade  (Sweeny's)  moved  south 
on  the  Corinth  road  to  act  as  a  reserve,  though  it 
was  not  permitted  to  wait  upon  opportunity.  Two 
regiments  of  this  brigade  (7th  and  58th  Illinois) 
were  sent  at  once  to  the  right  to  prolong  Tuttle 's 
line  to  connect  with  McClernand,  going  into  posi- 
tion at  about  nine-thirty  o'clock.  A  third  regiment 
(50th  Illinois)  was  sent  to  McArthur  on  the  left; 
and  the  remaining  regiment  of  the  brigade  (8th 
Iowa),  between  eleven  and  twelve  o'clock,  took  posi- 
tion at  Tuttle 's  left  in  the  "  sunken  road"  connect- 


64  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

ing  its  left  with  Prentiss  who,  having  rallied  a  part 
of  his  division,  put  them  in  at  the  right  of  Huiibut. 
Prentiss  was  here  joined  under  fire  by  the  23d  Mis- 
souri, just  landed  from  the  boats,  giving  him  about 
one  thousand  men  in  the  " Hornets'  Nest".  Two 
other  regiments  (15th  and  16th  Iowa),  assigned  to 
Prentiss 's  division,  landing  too  late  to  join  him  at 
his  camp,  were  sent  to  McClernand,  joining  him  at 
Jones's  Field,  one  and  a  half  miles  west  of  the 
Landing. 

Before  noon  the  contending  armies  were  in  con- 
tinuous and  compact  line  from  flank  to  flank. 
Welded  in  the  furnace  heat  of  four  hours'  battle 
without  a  moment's  respite,  it  might  be  said  with 
little  exaggeration  that  the  men  stood  foot  to  foot, 
contending  for  the  mastery.  The  Union  lines  had 
steadily  but  slowly  receded,  shortening  at  the  flanks, 
and  the  Confederates  had  as  steadily  advanced, 
extending  their  flanks  but  recoiling  again  and  again 
from  attacks  made  at  the  center,  and  with  heavy 
loss. 

The  Confederate  reserve  under  General  Breck- 
enridge,  about  8,500  men,  were  all  in  action  before 
noon,  the  first  brigade  (Trabue)  going  in  on  their 
extreme  left  at  about  the  time  that  Sherman  fell 
back  from  his  first  line.  The  other  two  brigades 
(Bowen  and  Statham)  went  into  line  on  the  right, 
south  of  the  Peach  Orchard,  between  eleven  and 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  65 

twelve  o'clock,  in  front  of  Hurlbut  and  near  where 
General  Johnston  had  his  headquarters  in  the  sad- 
dle. Though  General  Johnston  personally  directed 
the  battle  on  the  Confederate  side,  in  this  part  of  the 
field,  he  did  not,  as  some  writers  have  told  the  story, 
personally  encourage  an  unwilling  Tennessee  regi- 
ment by  riding  along  the  line  and  tapping  the  bay- 
onets of  the  men  with  a  tin  cup  which  he  carried  in 
his  hand,  then  leading  the  line  in  a  furious  charge. 
No  part  of  such  an  incident  occurred  there  or  else- 
where, on  the  authority  of  one  of  General  John- 
ston's chief  Aids,  Governor  Harris  of  Tennessee  — 
the  only  person  who  was  present  at  the  death  of 
General  Johnston  soon  after,  and  near  the  spot 
where  the  incident  is  said  to  have  occurred. 

Stuart,  McArthur,  and  Hurlbut  having  success- 
fully repulsed  several  attacks,  General  Johnston 
was  evidently  convinced  that  the  Union  left  was  not 
to  be  easily  turned;  and  so  about  noon  under  his 
personal  direction,  having  put  into  his  lines  two 
brigades  of  the  reserve  under  General  Brecken- 
ridge,  a  forward  movement  was  ordered,  six  bri- 
gades participating  —  Chalmers's,  Jackson's,  Bow- 
en's,  Statham's,  Stephens 's,  and  Gladden 's.  Threat- 
ened on  his  left  by  a  cavalry  flanking  movement, 
Stuart  was  the  first  slowly  to  give  ground;  Mc- 
Arthur, on  Stuart's  right,  necessarily  followed, 
both  changing  front  from  south  to  southeast,  falling 


66  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

back  and  fighting  for  every  foot  of  ground.  This 
movement  compelled  Hurlbut  to  retire  from  his 
first  position  to  the  north  side  of  the  Peach  Or- 
chard (Map  IV).  At  about  two  o'clock,  Colonel 
Stuart  having  been  wounded,  his  two  regiments 
having  lost  heavily,  and  having  exhausted  their 
ammunition  —  even  after  robbing  the  cartridge- 
boxes  of  their  dead  and  wounded  comrades  —  re- 
tired toward  the  Landing.  General  McArthur 
followed  not  long  after ;  and  General  Hurlbut,  hav- 
ing connected  Ms  right  with  General  Prentiss's 
left,  swung  back  until  their  lines  were  nearly  at 
right  angles  (Map  V).  Hurlbut  retired  toward 
the  Landing  at  about  four  or  four-thirty  o'clock, 
leaving  the  line  from  left  to  right  in  the  following 
order:  Prentiss's  command,  8th  Iowa  of  Sweeny's 
brigade,  Tuttle's  full  brigade,  and  the  58th  Illinois 
of  Sweeny's  brigade. 

While  this  fierce  struggle  was  in  progress  on  the 
Confederate  right,  at  about  two-thirty  afternoon, 
General  Johnston  received  the  wound  from  which 
he  died  a  few  minutes  later.  General  Bragg  then 
took  command  of  the  right,  and  General  Ruggles 
succeeded  Bragg  in  the  center. 

While  the  battle  raged  on  the  Union  left,  as  des- 
cribed, it  was  not  less  stubborn  and  bloody  on  the 
right;  but  Sherman  and  McClernand  were  forced 
back  to  the  Hamburg  and  Savannah  road  —  a  mile 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  67 

from  the  Landing  —  about  four-thirty  o'clock,  the 
Confederates  gradually  closing  in  from  both  flanks 
around  the  center  (Map  VI).  Meantime  General 
W.  H.  L.  Wallace  had  sent  orders  for  his  command 
to  retire ;  but  for  some  reason  never  explained  four 
of  his  six  regiments  did  not  receive  the  order  and 
were  captured,  as  will  be  explained.  As  General 
Wallace  and  General  Tuttle,  followed  by  the  2nd 
and  7th  Iowa  Regiments,  were  fighting  their  way 
through  a  severe  crossfire  at  short  range,  General 
Wallace  was  mortally  wounded,  and  was  left  on  the 
field  to  be  recovered  the  next  day,  dying  three  or 
four  days  later  without  recovering  consciousness. 

THE  HORNETS'  NEST 

This  appellation  owes  its  origin  to  the  men  who 
felt  the  sting  of  the  hornets.  William  Preston 
Johnston  in  his  history  of  his  father  (General  A.  S. 
Johnston)  speaks  of  the  term  as  a  "mild  met- 
aphor", and  says  that  "no  figure  of  speech  would  be 
too  strong  to  express  the  deadly  peril  of  an  assault 
upon  this  natural  fortress  whose  inaccessible  bar- 
riers blazed  for  six  hours  with  sheets  of  flame,  and 
whose  infernal  gates  poured  forth  a  murderous 
storm  of  shot  and  shell  and  musket-fire  which  no 
living  thing  could  quell  or  withstand".49 

No  more  graphic  description  of  the  fight  at  the 
Hornets'  Nest  has  been  written  than  that  of  which 


68  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

the  language  quoted  is  a  part  —  written  from  the 
view-point  of  the  attacking  forces,  and,  therefore, 
written  with  full  knowledge  of  the  results  that  fol- 
lowed from  the  "murderous  storm  of  shot  and  shell 
and  musket-fire."  It  is  literally  true  that  Duncan 
Field  and  the  woods  and  thickets  bordering  it  along 
the  "sunken  road"  were  thickly  strewn  with  the 
dead  and  wounded.  The  same  author  tells  us  that 
"Hindman's  brilliant  brigades  ....  were  shivered 
into  fragments  and  paralyzed" ;  that  Stewart's  reg- 
iments ....  retired  mangled  from  the  field";  that 
"Gibson's  splendid  brigade  ....  recoiled  and  fell 
back" — four  several  times,  indeed.  Colonel  Gib- 
son, in  his  official  report  says  of  his  brigade :  ' '  Four 
times  the  position  was  charged  and  four  times  the 
assault  proved  unavailing." 

The  best  informed  writer,  living  or  dead,  on  the 
details  and  incidents  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh  —  Ma- 
jor D.  W.  Reed,  Secretary  and  Historian  of  the 
Shiloh  National  Military  Park  Commission  and 
author  of  Campaigns  and  Battles  Twelfth  Regiment 
Iowa  Veteran  Volunteer  Infantry,  who  was  himself 
in  the  Nest  during  the  entire  day,  says  there  were 
"twelve  separate  and  distinct  charges"  made  upon 
the  line  at  the  Hornets'  Nest,  with  the  result  that 
/  three  Confederate  brigades  were  "entirely  disor- 
ganized", and  that  "thirteen  regiments  lost  their 
regimental  organizations and  were  not  brought 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  69 

into  the  fight  again  ....  during  the  day."50  Gen- 
eral Buggies,  who  commanded  the  Confederate 
lines  in  that  part  of  the  field  after  the  death  of  Gen- 
eral Johnston,  designates  this  as  "one  of  the  con- 
trolling conflicts  of  that  eventful  day."51  The 
position  was  of  such  conspicuous  importance  that  a 
brief  description  of  the  ground  will  not  be  out  of 
place. 

Moving  out  on  the  Corinth  road  from  the  Land- 
ing about  three-fourths  of  a  mile  one  crosses  the 
Hamburg  and  Savannah  road.  A  fourth  of  a  mile 
further  on  the  road  forks,  the  left-hand  branch 
(Eastern  Corinth)  bearing  south  of  southwest;  and 
one-fourth  of  a  mile  still  further  on  it  crosses  an  old 
abandoned  road  near  the  southeast  corner  of  Dun- 
can Field,  and  near  the  center  of  the  Hornets'  Nest. 
The  right-hand  road  from  the  fork  runs  nearly 
west,  crossing  the  north  end  of  Duncan  Field,  then 
bearing  south  passes  the  "Little  Log  Meeting- 
house". At  the  point  where  this  road,  going  from 
the  Landing,  strikes  the  east  line  of  Duncan  Field 
the  abandoned  road  leads  off  to  the  southeast  about 
a  half-mile,  then  bending  east  to  the  Hamburg  and 
Savannah  road  near  Bloody  Pond  —  another  sig- 
nificant local  name.  Along  this  abandoned  road, 
beginning  near  the  north  end  of  Duncan  Field,  the 
line  of  battle  from  right  to  left,  was  as  follows: 
58th  Illinois  (Sweeny's  brigade)  ;  second,  seventh, 


70  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

twelfth,  and  fourteenth  Iowa  regiments  (Turtle's 
brigade)  ;  to  the  left  of  this  brigade  was  the  eighth 
Iowa,  of  Sweeny's  brigade;  to  the  left  still  was 
Prentiss's  division,  consisting  of  one  entire  regi- 
ment (23d  Missouri),  and  parts  of  several  other 
regiments  —  the  entire  line  numbering  not  to  ex- 
ceed 2,500  men.  The  old  road  ran  along  a  slight 
elevation  and  was  so  water-washed  in  places  as  to 
afford  good  shelter  to  men  lying  down  to  fire  on  an 
advancing  enemy  —  a  sort  of  natural  rifle-pit, 
though  rather  shallow  in  places.  About  half  of  the 
distance,  from  right  to  left,  there  was  open  field 
extending  to  the  front  about  500  yards  to  the  timber 
occupied  by  the  Confederates.  The  left  half  of  the 
line  was  well  screened  by  timber  and,  for  the  most 
part,  by  a  heavy  growth  of  underbrush  so  that  the 
advancing  lines  not  able  to  see  the  men  lying  in  the 
old  road  were  received  with  a  crushing  fire  at  short 
range.  In  every  instance  the  repulse  was  complete 
and  bloody. 

General  Ruggles,  becoming  convinced  that  the 
position  could  not  be  taken  by  infantry,  from  the 
front,  determined  to  concentrate  his  artillery  and 
bombard  the  strong-hold.  He  tells  us  in  his  official 
report 52  that  he  directed  his  staff  officers  "to  bring 
forward  all  the  field  guns  they  could  collect  from 
the  left  toward  the  right".  General  Ruggles  evi- 
dently believed  that  this  was  a  crisis  in  the  battle, 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  71 

admitting  that ' '  for  a  brief  period  the  enemy  appar- 
ently gained".  Nor  was  he  alone  in  the  belief,  for 
one  of  his  artillery  officers  (Captain  Sandidge)  said 
officially:  "I  have  no  doubt  that  had  they  been 
seasonably  reinforced  when  they  checked  our  ad- 
vancing troops,  they  could  certainly  have  broken 
our  lines".  And  he  feared  that  result  before  the 
guns  could  be  planted  and  infantry  supports 
brought  up.  General  Buggies  succeeded  in  bring- 
ing up  sixty-two  guns  from  the  left,  which  were 
planted  on  the  west  side  of  Duncan  Field  about  five 
hundred  yards  away ;  and  the  bombardment  began 
at  about  four-thirty  afternoon.  Of  course  there 
could  be  but  one  result.  The  Union  batteries  were 
forced  to  retire,  leaving  the  way  clear  for  the  en- 
circling Confederate  lines  to  close  in.  Besides  the 
Ruggles  aggregation  of  artillery  of  sixty-two  guns, 
there  must  have  been  several  other  batteries  playing 
upon  the  Hornets'  Nest  from  the  right,  as  none  of 
the  guns  from  that  part  of  the  field  were  in  the 
Buggies  aggregation.  Probably  not  less  than  sev- 
enty-five guns  were  trained  on  that  devoted  spot, 
and  fully  three-fourths  of  the  Confederate  army 
was  coiling  around  it.  And  for  some  time  before 
the  surrender  took  place,  a  few  minutes  before  six 
o  'clock,  rifle-fire  poured  in  from  three  directions,  as 
the  beleagured  faced  about  and  attempted  to  fight 
their  way  out.  The  number  to  surrender  was  about 


72  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

2,000  men.  The  importance  of  this  prolonged  con- 
test, from  a  little  before  ten  forenoon  to  nearly  six 
afternoon,  upon  the  destinies  of  the  day  can  hardly 
be  estimated.  It  secured  to  General  Grant 's  army 
the  thing  most  needed  —  time  to  form  the  new  line ; 
time  for  Lew.  Wallace,  for  Buell,  and  for  Night  to 
come.  The  Hornets'  Nest  was  distinctly  an  altar 
of  sacrifice  (Map  VI). 

HOW  BUELL  SAVED  THE  DAY 

By  the  time  the  Confederate  officers  had  re- 
covered from  their  " surprise"  at  the  smallness  of 
the  capture  at  the  Hornets'  Nest,  in  view  of  the 
prolonged  and  effective  resistance  encountered, 
General  Grant  had  formed  his  new  line  on  the  north 
side  of  Dill  Branch,  running  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Branch  on  a  curve  back  to  the  road  leading  from 
the  Landing ;  thence  west  to  the  Hamburg  and  Sa- 
vannah road ;  thence  north  to  the  swamp  bordering 
Snake  Creek.  At  the  extreme  left  of  the  line,  the 
two  gunboats  lay  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  Branch. 
On  the  bluffs  near  the  mouth  of  the  Branch  were 
two  batteries,  trained  up-stream.  Two  other  bat- 
teries were  a  little  farther  from  the  river  and  back 
nearer  the  road  leading  from  the  Landing ;  and  two 
more  were  still  farther  west,  but  advanced  toward 
the  edge  of  the  bluffs  overlooking  the  Branch.  Back 


THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH  73 

on  the  road  again  and  a  little  west  were  two  more 
batteries  before  coming  to  the  six  big  siege  guns. 

A  glance  at  the  map  for  Sunday  night's  position 
will  show  that  the  line  from  the  mouth  of  Dill 
Branch  west  to  the  siege  guns  was  a  semi-circle 
with  the  gunboats  at  the  extreme  left,  and  that  there 
were  about  fifty  guns  in  the  line  east  of  the  Ham- 
burg and  Savannah  road,  exclusive  of  the  gunboats. 
Behind  this  array  of  artillery  was  ample  infantry 
support,  except  on  the  extreme  left  where  support 
was  not  needed,  because  of  the  nature  of  the  ground 
in  front.  As  General  Nelson  marched  the  head  of 
his  column  up  from  the  Landing  at  about  five-  thirty 
o'clock,  he  noted  the  absence  of  infantry  along  that 
part  of  the  line,  and  in  his  official  report  he  de- 
scribes what  he  saw  as  a  "semicircle  of  artillery, 
totally  unsupported  by  infantry",  which  was  not 
quite  true ;  and  he  added  another  statement  which 
was  not  at  all  true,  namely;  "the  left  of  the  artil- 
lery was  completely  turned  by  the  enemy  and  the 
gunners  fled  from  their  pieces."  53  General  Nelson 
evidently  knew  nothing  of  the  batteries  near  the 
mouth  of  Dill  Branch,  for  he  struck  the  line  at  about 
the  middle  of  the  "semicircle"  and  the  single  regi- 
ment that  he  brought  into  action  (36th  Indiana) 
was  sent  to  support  the  guns  in  front  of  the  main 
line  toward  Dill  Branch. 

Opposed  to  this  array  of  Union  artillery  a  single 


74  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

Confederate  battery  took  part  in  the  last  attack, 
and  that  was  disabled. 

Any  fair-minded  person,  having  knowledge  of 
the  character  of  the  ground  between  the  lines  of  the 
two  armies  as  the  lines  were  on  Sunday  night  —  es- 
pecially on  the  left  of  the  Union  lines  —  must  ad- 
mit that  Grant's  was  a  strong  position  and  that  his 
antagonist  had  serious  obstacles  to  overcome  before 
he  could  strike  with  effect. 

With  as  little  delay  as  possible  after  the  sur- 
render at  the  Hornets'  Nest,  General  Bragg,  still 
commanding  the  Confederate  right,  ordered  his 
division  commanders  to  "drive  the  enemy  into  the 
river",  believing,  doubtless,  that  the  "drive"  would 
be  a  brief  and  easy  task.  Accordingly  the  Confed- 
erate right  uncoiled  itself  from  around  the  Hornets' 
Nest  and,  led  by  Chalmers's  and  Jackson's  bri- 
gades of  Withers 's  division,  advanced  along  the 
road  toward  the  Landing ;  then,  filing  right,  formed 
line  on  the  south  side  of  Dill  Branch  and  near  the 
margin  of  the  deep  ravine.  This  ravine,  impass- 
able at  its  mouth  by  reason  of  steep  bluffs  and  back- 
water, was  difficult  to  pass  fully  a  half-mile  from 
its  mouth.  Its  steep  sides  were  timbered  and  ob- 
structed by  underbrush,  and  at  the  bottom  it  was 
fairly  choked  with  undergrowth. 

The  last  attack  made  upon  the  Union  lines  was 
upon  the  extreme  left  in  which  only  two  small  bri- 


THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH  75 

gades  and  one  battery  participated.  Chalmers's 
brigade  had  nominally  five  regiments,  but  one  of 
the  regiments  (52nd  Tennessee)  " acted  badly"  in 
the  early  part  of  the  day,  and  three  hundred  of  its 
four  hundred  men  are  not  to  be  counted.  Jackson's 
brigade  detached  one  regiment  to  guard  the  Horn- 
ets'  Nest  prisoners,  so  that  it  seems  to  be  liberal, 
allowing  for  the  losses  of  the  day,  to  say  that  there 
were  not  to  exceed  1800  men  engaged  in  the  last 
assault. 

The  two  brigades  made  their  way  down  the  south- 
ern slope,  through  the  tangled  undergrowth  at  the 
bottom  of  the  ravine  and,  quoting  from  their  official 
reports,  " struggled"  up  the  other  slope,  "which 
was  very  steep"  encountering  in  " attempting  to 
mount  the  last  ridge"  the  "fire  from  a  whole  line 
of  batteries  protected  by  infantry  and  assisted  by 
shells  from  the  gunboats. ' '  General  Chalmers  says 
his  men ' '  were  too  much  exhausted  to  storm  the  bat- 
teries". 54 

General  Jackson  says  his  men  were  without  am- 
munition, having  "only  their  bayonets  to  rely  on", 
and  that  when  "they  arrived  near  the  crest  of  the 
opposite  hill",  they  "could  not  be  urged  farther 
without  support",  the  men  "sheltering  themselves 
against  the  precipitous  sides  of  the  ravine"  where 
* ' they  remained  under  fire  for  some  time. ' ' 55  (The 


76  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

Confederate  skirmish  line  is  shown  on  Map  VI,  at 
the  crest  of  the  bluff,  north  of  Dill  Branch.) 

This  was  the  situation  when  eight  companies  of 
the  36th  Indiana  (Colonel  Grose),  about  four  hun- 
dred men,  of  Ammen's  brigade,  Nelson's  division, 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  arrived  on  the  scene.  Colonel 
Grose  was  ordered  to  go  to  the  support  of  Stone's 
battery,  which  was  in  position  some  distance  in  ad- 
vance of  Grant's  main  line  and  near  the  brow  of  the 
hill  up  which  the  assailants  were  climbing  with 
great  difficulty.  There  the  36th  Indiana  exchanged 
shots  with  the  skirmishers  of  Chalmers's  brigade, 
during  fifteen  to  thirty  minutes 56  having  one  man 
killed  and  one  man  wounded.  In  his  history  of  the 
36th  Indiana,  Colonel  Grose  says  that  "after  three 
or  four  rounds  the  enemy  fell  back.  It  was  then 
dark."  And  he  says,  further,  that  "no  part  of 
Buell's  army,  except  the  Thirty-sixth  Indiana,  took 
any  part  whatever  in  the  Sunday  evening  fight  at 
Shiloh. "  And  he  might  have  said  with  equal  truth 
and  without  disparagement  to  his  regiment  that  the 
presence  of  the  Thirty-sixth  Indiana  had  no  effect 
in  determining  the  issues  of  the  day.  Had  the  four 
hundred  men  not  been  there  the  "enemy"  would 
have  retired  just  the  same,  for  he  could  never  have 
crossed  the  open  space  from  the  "last  ridge"  to  the 
' 1  line  of  batteries ' '.  The  ground  to  be  traversed  was 
but  gently  rolling  with  little  to  obstruct  the  view  — 


THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH  77 


no  sheltering  ridge  or  friendly  copse  to  admit  of 
unobserved  approach.  It  must  have  been  a  ' '  rush ' ' 
of  two  to  four  hundred  yards,  in  the  face  of  point- 
blank  firing,  to  reach  the  batteries,  behind  which, 
as  already  stated,  was  ample  infantry  support. 
The  battle  of  the  day  really  came  to  an  end  at  the 
Hornets'  Nest.  All  that  followed  was  mere  skir- 
mishing for  the  purpose  of  developing  the  new  con- 
ditions. 

THE  LOST  OPPORTUNITY 

The  "Lost  Opportunity"  is  a  phrase  of  Confed- 
erate origin  and  it  refers  to  the  last  moments  of 
Sunday's  battle,  briefly  described  above.  Both  the 
idea  and  the  phrase  seem  to  have  been  born  of  an 
afterthought,  and  a  disposition  to  shift  blame  to 
the  shoulders  of  General  Beauregard,  should 
blame  be  imputed,  for  failure  to  crush  or  capture 
Grant's  army.  The  claim  has  been  put  forward 
with  considerable  persistency  that  the  order  of  Gen- 
eral Beauregard  to  withdraw  from  the  contest  was 
responsible  for  the  escape  of  Grant's  army.  This 
absurd  claim  has  been  answered  most  effectively 
by  General  Thomas  Jordan,  Adjutant-General  of 
the  Confederate  forces  engaged  at  Shiloh. 

In  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers™  General 
Jordan  takes  up  the  subject  and  refers  to  the  offi- 
cial reports  of  several  division,  brigade,  and  regi- 


78  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

mental  commanders  for  the  purpose  of  showing 
the  demoralized  and  exhausted  condition  of  the 
Confederate  army.  In  referring  to  the  report  of 
General  Withers,  two  brigades  of  whose  division 
made  the  last  feeble  assault,  he  says :  "If  there  be 
significance  in  words,  he  makes  it  clear  that  such 
was  the  absolute  lateness  of  the  hour,  that  had  the 
attempt  been  made  to  carry  the  Federal  batteries 
....  with  such  troops  as  were  there  assembled,  it 
would  have  resulted  in  an  awful  butchery  and  dis- 
persion of  all  employed  in  so  insensate,  so  prepos- 
terous an  undertaking ;  and  such  must  be  the  verdict 
of  any  military  man  who  may  studiously  read  the 
reports  of  the  subordinate  officers  of  Withers 's 
three  brigades,  and  bear  in  mind  the  formidable 
line  of  fifty-odd  pieces  of  artillery  which  Webster 
had  improvised '  '.58 

Surgeon  J.  C.  Nott  of  General  Bragg 's  staff,  who 
rode  by  his  chief's  side  nearly  all  day,  is  quoted  as 
saying  that  the  ' l  men  ....  were  too  much  demoral- 
ized and  indisposed  to  advance  in  the  face  of  the 
shells  ....  bursting  over  us  in  every  direction,  and 

my  impression  was that  our  troops  had  done  all 

that  they  would  do,  and  had  better  be  withdrawn. ' ' 59 

Another  officer  of  General  Bragg 's  staff,  Colonel 
Urquhart,  writing  in  1880  is  quoted  thus:  "The 
plain  truth  must  be  told,  that  our  troops  at  the 
front  were  a  thin  line  of  exhausted  men,  who  were 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  79 

making  no  further  headway Several  years  of 

subsequent  service  have  impressed  me  that  General 
Beauregard  's  order  for  withdrawing  the  troops  was 
most  timely".60 

The  claim  that  there  was  a  "Lost  Opportunity" 
because  of  the  order  to  retire,  General  Jordan  says, 
"  becomes  simply  shameful,  under  the  light  of  the 
closely  contemporaneous  statements  of  every  divi- 
sion commander,  except  one  (Withers)  ;  of  all  the 
brigade  and  regimental  commanders  of  each  Con- 
federate corps,  including  the  reserve  whose  reports 
have  reached  the  light ;  that  is,  of  nearly  all  com- 
manders present  in  the  battle. ' ' 

This  ought  to  be  sufficient  evidence  to  settle  for- 
ever both  propositions  in  the  negative ;  namely,  the 
claim  that  Buell  " saved  the  day",  and  that  there 
was  a  "Lost  Opportunity". 

The  condition  of  Grant's  army  at  the  close  of 
Sunday's  battle  as  to  strength  has  been  greatly 
underrated  by  certain  writers,  and  its  disorganiza- 
tion has  been  greatly  exaggerated  by  writers  who 
have  had  an  object  in  so  representing  it.  It  is  true 
that  both  armies  were  badly  battered  as  the  result 
of  about  fourteen  hours'  continuous  fighting  with 
scarcely  a  moment 's  cessation.  Careful  study  of  the 
reports  of  Confederate  officers  shows  that  there 
was  not  a  single  point  of  attack  on  any  part  of  the 
field  at  any  hour  of  the  day  where  there  was  not 


80  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

stubborn  resistance  with  serious  loss  to  the  attack- 
ing forces.  These  reports  also  show  that  there  was 
serious  defection  from  their  ranks,  beginning  early 
and  continuing  during  the  day,  and  that  when  night 
came  on  there  was  such  disorganization  that  some 
of  their  commanders  were  entirely  separated  from 
their  commands  and  remained  so  separated  to  the 
close  of  the  battle,  Monday  night.  These  reports 
further  show  that  instead  of  bivouacking  in  line  of 
battle  as  did  Grant's  army  the  entire  Confederate 
army,  with  the  exception  of  a  single  brigade 
(Pond's  brigade  on  the  extreme  left)  withdrew  a 
distance  of  two  to  four  miles  from  the  Landing.  It 
is  in  evidence  also  from  the  same  sources  of  infor- 
mation that  General  Beauregard  was  able  to  put  in 
line  on  the  morning  of  the  second  day  substantially 
half  the  number  of  men  that  were  in  line  on  the 
morning  of  the  first  day.  General  Grant  was  able 
to  put  in  line  about  the  same  proportion,  exclusive 
of  the  reinforcements  that  came  up  during  the 
night. 

There  are  no  means  of  determining  the  compara- 
tive casualties  in  the  two  armies  on  the  first  day, 
but  there  is  no  reason  for  doubting  that  they  were 
substantially  equal  —  exclusive  of  the  capture  at 
the  Hornets'  Nest.  It  is  known,  however,  that  the 
casualties  among  field  officers,  from  the  grade  of 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH  81 

colonel  upward,  were  greater  in  the  Union  than  in 
the  Confederate  army  in  Sunday's  battle. 

Much  has  been  said  about  the  " stragglers"  from 
the  Union  lines  crowding  the  Landing  and  "cower- 
ing" under  the  river  bluffs  —  and  with  about  the 
same  degree  of  exaggeration  as  certain  writers  have 
indulged  in  their  descriptions  of  the  opening  of 
the  battle.  There  were  " stragglers"  from  both 
armies,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the 
numbers  were  substantially  equal.  It  is  true,  how- 
ever, that  the  straggling  was  more  in  evidence  on 
the  Union  side,  for  the  very  good  reason  that  it  was 
more  concentrated  —  confined  to  a  limited  area 
about  the  Landing  —  while  on  the  other  side  there 
was  unlimited  room  for  expansion  and  scattering 
over  miles  of  territory.  This  remark  applies  with 
equal  force  to  other  features  of  the  crowded  condi- 
tion near  the  Landing,  late  in  the  day.  Hundreds 
of  teamsters  with  their  four-mule  and  six-mule 
teams  were  there  because  it  was  the  only  place  of 
safety  for  one  of  the  essential  parts  of  the  army's 
equipment ;  the  sick  from  the  regimental  hospitals 
and  company  tents  were  there  —  several  hundred 
of  them  —  because  there  was  no  other  place  to  go ; 
and  hundreds  of  wounded  were  there  from  the  front, 
together  with  a  force  of  hospital  attendants.  Add 
these  together  and  you  have  several  thousand  with- 
out counting  a  single  "straggler".  These  things 


82  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

are  never  considered  by  critics  who  have  a  cause  to 
support.  Every  large  army  requires  a  small  army 
to  care  for  it,  who  are,  necessarily,  noncombatants. 

BTIELL  COMES  ON  THE  FIELD 

By  General  Orders  of  March  31st,  General 
Grant's  headquarters  were  transferred  from  Sa- 
vannah to  Pittsburg  Landing;  but  a  headquarters' 
office  was  continued  at  the  former  place  for  conven- 
ience up  to  the  day  of  the  battle,  and  General  Grant 
passed  between  the  two  places  every  day,  or  nearly 
every  day,  on  the  headquarters'  boat,  Tigress.  On 
Sunday  morning,  at  Savannah,  an  "early  break- 
fast" had  been  ordered,  as  it  was  General  Grant's 
purpose  to  ride  out  with  his  staff  to  meet  General 
Buell,  whose  arrival  the  evening  before  was  not 
known.  While  at  breakfast,  firing  was  heard  in  the 
direction  of  Pittsburg  Landing  —  "the  breakfast 
was  left  unfinished"  and  General  Grant  and  staff 
went  directly  to  the  boat  and  steamed  rapidly  up 
the  river,  stopping  at  Crump's  Landing  to  order 
General  Lew.  Wallace  to  hold  his  division  in  readi- 
ness for  marching  orders. 

Before  leaving  Savannah  General  Grant  sent  to 
General  Nelson  of  Buell 's  army,  the  following  or- 
der: "An  attack  having  been  made  on  our  forces, 
you  will  move  your  entire  command  to  the  river  op- 
posite Pittsburg".62  A  similar  order  was  sent  to 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  83 

General  Wood,  commanding  another  division  of 
Buell's  army,  not  yet  arrived  at  Savannah,  to  move 
"with  the  utmost  dispatch  to  the  river"  at  Savan- 
nah, where  boats  would  meet  him.  The  following 
note  was  left  for  General  Buell  whose  presence  in 
Savannah  was  not  known  to  General  Grant : 

Savannah,  April  6,  1862 
General  D.  C.  BUELL: 

Heavy  firing  is  heard  up  the  river,  indicating  plainly  that 
an  attack  has  been  made  on  our  most  advanced  positions.  I 
have  been  looking  for  this,  but  did  not  believe  that  the  attack 
could  be  made  before  Monday  or  Tuesday.  This  necessitates 
my  joining  the  forces  up  the  river  instead  of  meeting  you  today, 
as  I  had  contemplated.  I  have  directed  General  Nelson  to 
move  to  the  river  with  his  division.  He  can  march  to  opposite 
Pittsburg. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT 
Major-General  Commanding.63 

This  note  clearly  shows  that  General  Grant,  in 
common  with  his  division  commanders,  was  expect- 
ing an  early  attack. 

As  soon  as  General  Grant,  after  arriving  on  the 
field,  learned  the  true  situation,  he  sent  a  staff  of- 
ficer with  another  order  to  General  Nelson:  "you 
will  hurry  up  your  command  as  fast  as  possible. 
All  looks  well  but  it  is  necessary  for  you  to  push 
forward  as  fast  as  possible".64  Later  still,  prob- 
ably about  noon  though  it  may  have  been  later, 
nothing  having  been  heard  either  from  Buell  or 


84  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH 

Nelson,  General  Grant  sent  another  hurry-up  order 
addressed  to  the  "  Commanding  Officer  Advance 
Forces  (Buell  's  Army) ' '.  This  order  was  delivered 
to  General  Buell  on  the  boat  as  he  was  going  to  the 
Landing.  He  arrived  at  the  Landing,  he  tells  us  in 
Skiloh  Reviewed,  about  1  o'clock,  though  Villard, 
who  claims  to  have  been  on  the  same  boat,  makes 
the  time  later,  between  5  and  6  o'clock,  about  the 
time  that  Nelson's  advance  crossed  the  river.  And 
there  are  certain  features  of  Buell 's  official  report 
which,  in  the  absence  of  a  definite  statement  on  the 
point,  make  Villard 's  claim  as  to  the  hour  at  least 
plausible. 

General  Grant's  first  order  to  General  Nelson 
must  have  been  received  as  early  as  7  o'clock  — 
probably  earlier,  for  Nelson  had  the  order  when 
General  Buell,  after  hearing  the  firing,  went  to 
General  Grant's  headquarters  for  information, 
where  he  learned  that  the  latter  had  "just  started 
for  the  Landing".65 

General  Nelson  in  his  official  report  does  not  state 
the  hour  of  receiving  the  order  to  march,  but  says 
that  he  "left  Savannah,  by  order  of  General  Grant, 
reiterated  by  General  Buell  in  person,  at  1.30  p. 
m."66  The  language  is  a  little  ambiguous,  but  it 
doubtless  means  that  the  order  was  "reiterated" 
about  noon  or  later  and  that  the  march  began  at 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  85 

one-thirty,  afternoon.67  (Colonel  Ammen  says  at 
one,  afternoon.) 

Villard,  heretofore  quoted,  says  that  Nelson  re- 
ceived Grant's  order  about  noon,  by  which  he  prob- 
ably means  the  "reiterated"  order.  In  any  event 
it  appears  that  General  Buell  "held  up"  the  order 
to  Nelson  fully  five  hours  and  then  "reiterated"  it. 
Why  did  General  Buell  do  that  ?  Why  did  General 
Nelson  wait  to  have  the  order  *  *  reiterated ' '  ?  Why 
did  he  not  obey  the  original  order  regardless  of  any 
dilatory  order  from  General  Buell,  since  the  con- 
tingency had  arisen  under  which  by  General  Hal- 
leek's  instructions  General  Grant  was  "authorized 
to  take  the  general  command"  of  both  armies; 
namely,  an  attack  upon  his  own  army  ?  Had  Gen- 
eral Nelson  marched  under  the  original  order,  his 
division  would  have  been  on  the  field  at  about  the 
time  that  it  started  on  the  ten-mile  march.  What 
might  have  been  the  effect  of  throwing  4,500  fresh 
men  in  the  scale  of  battle,  then  hanging  in  doubtful 
poise,  is,  of  course,  conjectural  —  and  it  must  be 
left  to  conjecture,  though  there  is  little  room  for 
doubt. 

General  Nelson's  entire  division  was  across  the 
river  soon  after  dark.  Advancing  a  little  to  the 
front  on  the  extreme  left  it  bivouacked  for  the  night. 
A  little  later  General  Lew.  Wallace  came  up  on  the 
extreme  right,  his  division  numbering  about  5,000 


86  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

men;  but  having  to  counter-march  the  division  in 
order  to  bring  the  regiments  in  proper  position 
his  formation  was  not  completed  until  after  mid- 
night when  it  went  into  bivouack. 

During  Sunday  night  Crittenden's  division  of 
Buell's  army  (two  brigades)  came  up  by  boat,  and 
in  the  morning  two  brigades  of  McCook's  division 
arrived,  to  be  joined  about  noon  by  another  brigade. 
Wood's  division,  which  was  about  thirty  miles 
away  when  the  battle  began,  arrived  on  the  field  at 
about  two  afternoon  Monday,  when  the  battle  was 
about  over.  The  total  additions  to  the  Union  lines 
up  to  noon  on  Monday  was  approximately  20,000 
men. 

During  Sunday's  battle  General  Grant  passed 
from  point  to  point  behind  the  firing  line,  meeting 
and  consulting  with  his  division  commanders  and 
carefully  observing  the  movements  of  the  contend- 
ing forces,  for,  as  has  already  been  stated,  there  was 
no  point  on  the  field  from  which  general  observa- 
tions could  be  made.  On  Monday  he  commanded 
his  own  army,  giving  no  orders  to  General  Buell, 
the  latter  exercising  independent  command.  Why 
General  Grant  did  not  assume  " general  command" 
of  both  armies  we  might  fairly  conjecture  (if  con- 
jecture were  necessary)  to  be  due  to  the  attitude  of 
General  Buell  toward  Grant's  order  to  Nelson  on 
Sunday  morning  —  treating  it  as  invalid  until  "re- 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  87 

iterated"  by  himself.  There  is  no  room  for  con- 
jecture in  the  matter,  however,  for  General  Buell 
says  in  his  Shiloh  Reviewed68:  "I  did  not  look 
upon  him  [Grant]  as  my  commander".  There  is 
evidence  also  that  Buell  was  disposed  to  treat  the 
subject  of  Sunday's  battle  as  something  of  a  sham 
—  that  the  resistance  to  the  Confederate  attacks 
was  not  particularly  strenuous.  General  Tuttle  of 
Grant's  army,  acted  on  Monday  as  reserve  to  Gen- 
eral Buell,  having  under  his  command  the  two  Iowa 
Regiments  that  cut  their  way  out  of  the  Hornets' 
Nest  on  Sunday,  and  one  or  two  other  regiments  of 
Grant's  army.  General  Tuttle  relates  that  "while 
passing  over  the  field,  April  7th",  following  up  the 
advancing  lines,  "General  Buell  taunted  me  with 
not  having  done  any  fighting  that  amounted  to  any- 
thing [on  Sunday]."  When  they  came  to  the 
"clearing"  in  front  of  the  Hornets'  Nest  and  saw 
the  ground  strewn  with  dead,  Buell  "was  compelled 
to  confess  that  there  must  have  been  terrible  fight- 
ing". Had  General  Buell  passed  over  the  ground 
at  the  Peach  Orchard  and  over  the  slope  in  front 
of  Sherman's  first  line,  he  would  have  found  sim- 
ilar conditions  to  those  in  the  "clearing"  in  front  of 
the  Hornets'  Nest.  His  estimate  of  the  vigor  of  the 
Confederate  attacks  on  Sunday  was  probably  based 
upon  the  feeble  attack  made  by  exhausted  men 


88  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

which  he  himself  saw  near  the  Landing  on  Sunday 
night. 

In  Monday's  battle  General  Buell's  army  consti- 
tuted the  left  and  General  Grant's  the  right,  with 
General  Lew.  Wallace's  fresh  division  occupying 
the  extreme  right  of  the  line  —  and  it  is  worth  men- 
tioning here  that  at  least  two  of  Grant's  regiments 
were  sent  before  the  battle  was  over  to  the 'extreme 
left,  and  one  of  them,  under  command  of  General 
Nelson,  made  a  bayonet  charge  across  an  open  field. 
Another  of  Grant's  regiments,  under  Crittenden 
and  near  the  center,  charged  and  captured  a  battery. 
In  neither  case  was  it  necessary  for  General  Grant 
to  " reiterate"  the  requisite  orders. 

As  to  the  outcome  of  the  contest  on  Monday  there 
could  be  no  doubt,  with  the  large  accession  to  the 
ranks  of  the  Union  army  —  a  force  nearly  equal  to 
the  number  of  men  that  the  Confederates  were  able 
to  put  in  line.  General  Grant  had  instructed  his 
division  commanders  on  Sunday  night  to  be  ready 
to  attack  early  in  the  morning,  and  General  Buell 
ordered  his  divisions  "to  move  forward  as  soon  as 
it  was  light".  Artillery  fire  began  nearly  at  the 
same  time  —  about  five-thirty  —  on  the  extreme 
flanks  of  the  Union  army,  though  the  lines  were  not 
in  contact  until  about  eight  o  'clock.  It  would  not  be 
correct  to  characterize  the  movements  of  the  Union 
lines  on  Monday  as  General  Beauregard  character- 


THE  BATTLE   OP  SHILOH  89 

ized  the  movements  of  the  Confederate  lines  on 
Sunday  —  the  figure  of  the  " Alpine  avalanche" 
would  not  apply  to  the  movements  of  either  day. 
However,  the  Union  lines  moved  forward  without 
serious  repulses  at  any  point,  though  there  were 
some  reverses  on  the  left.  The  Confederates  held 
their  ground  with  stubbornness,  occupying  the  line 
of  the  Purdy  road  until  about  noon.  By  two  o  'clock 
the  battle  was  practically  over,  and  an  hour  later 
the  Confederates  were  in  full  retreat.  Map  No. 
VII  will  give  a  good  idea  of  the  general  movements 
on  Monday.  There  was  no  general  pursuit  of  the 
defeated  army  —  just  enough  to  be  sure  that  it  was 
a  retreat  in  fact.  The  lack  of  pursuit  was  not,  how- 
ever, because  Grant  lacked  "the  energy  to  order  a 
pursuit",  as  John  Codman  Ropes  alleges,  but  be- 
cause Halleck's  instructions  did  not  permit  pur- 
suit; 69  hands  were  still  "tied". 

NUMBERS  ENGAGED  AND  LOSSES 

There  are  two  methods  of  estimating  the  strength 
of  an  army — one  method  excludes  all  noncombat- 
ants,  the  other  includes  noncombatants  as  essential 
parts  of  the  army.  On  the  inclusive  method,  the 
Historian  and  Secretary  of  the  Shiloh  National 
Military  Park  Commission 70  gives  the  strength  of 
Grant's  five  divisions  on  Sunday  at  39,830,  and  that 
of  Johnston 's  army  at  43,968.71  In  a  note 72  in  which 


90  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH 

he  excludes  noncombatants,  the  estimate  is  33,000 
and  40,000  respectively.  The  figures  last  given  cor- 
respond with  the  estimates  of  the  two  commanders 
—  Grant  in  his  Memoirs,  and  Johnston  in  his  dis- 
patch from  Corinth,  when  about  to  march .  In 
artillery,  Johnston  had  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
eight  guns  and  Grant  one  hundred  and  twelve.  Had 
Wallace's  division  come  upon  the  field  early  on 
Sunday  the  two  armies  would  have  been  very  evenly 
matched,  both  in  men  and  guns.  On  the  second  day, 
including  noncombatants  and  " stragglers",  the 
figures  given  are:  Union,  54,592;  Confederate, 
34,000. 73  The  complete  and  accurate  losses  of  the 
respective  armies  for  the  respective  days  have  never 
been,  and  cannot  be,  stated.  The  losses  of  Grant's 
army  by  divisions,  two  days  (except  3d  division  one 
day)  were  as  follows: 

Killed    Wounded  Prisoners        Total 


1st  division, 

McClernand    .     . 

285 

1,372 

85 

1,742 

2nd 

W.  H.  L.  Wallace 

270 

1,173 

1,306 

2,749 

3rd 

Lew.   Wallace     . 

41 

251 

4 

296 

4th 

Hurlbut     .     .     . 

317 

1,441 

111 

1,869 

5th 

Sherman    .     .     . 

325 

1,277 

299 

1,901 

6th 

Prentiss     .     .     . 

236 

928 

1,008 

2,172 

Unassigned 

39 

159 

17 

215 

Total  Array  Tenn 1,513  6,601  2,830  10,94474 

Army  of  the  Ohio,  Monday — 75 

2nd   division 88  823  7  918 

4th          "  93  603  20  716 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  91 


5th          "               .     . 

Killed    Wounded   Prisoners        Total 

.     .     .         60       377         28         465 

6th          "          ... 

4          ..              4 

Total 241     1,807         55      2,103 

Grand  total 1,754    8,408     2,885     13,047 

Army  of  Miss.  (Confederate)     1,728     8,012       959     10,69976 

The  killed  in  the  two  days'  battle  are  almost  ex- 
actly equal;  the  wounded  are  in  excess  by  nearly 
four  hundred,  in  the  Union  army ;  and  there  was  in 
the  Union  army  an  excess  in  prisoners,  of  1,926. 
Eliminating  the  prisoners  taken  in  the  Hornets' 
Nest,  it  appears  that  more  prisoners  were  taken  in 
the  open  field  by  the  Union  army  than  by  the  Con- 
federates. The  loss  in  officers  in  Grant's  army  on 
Sunday  from  the  grade  of  colonel  up  was  much 
heavier  than  in  the  Confederate  army  —  forty-five 
in  the  former  to  thirty  in  the  latter.77 

THE  LOST  DIVISION 

So  much  has  been  written  and  said  about  the  fail- 
ure of  General  Wallace  to  get  his  division  on  the 
field  and  into  the  fight  on  the  first  day  of  the  battle 
that  the  subject  deserves  a  separate  paragraph  and 
a  map  of  the  roads  over  which  his  division  marched. 
By  reference  to  the  map  (No.  VIII)  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  division  occupied  three  camps  —  one  bri- 
gade at  Crump's  Landing;  one  at  Stonylonesome, 
two  to  three  miles  west;  and  one  at  Adamsville, 
about  five  miles  out  from  the  Landing  toward 


92  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

Purdy.  There  is  no  dispute  about  the  fact  that 
Grant  on  his  way  up  the  river  on  Sunday  morning 
stopped  at  Crump's  Landing  to  notify  Wallace  to 
be  in  readiness  for  marching  orders,  though  Wal- 
lace makes  no  mention  of  the  fact  in  his  official  re- 
port, leaving  it  to  be  inferred  that  he  had  no  order 
from  Grant  in  the  morning.  He  says  that  from  the 
"continuous  cannonading"  he  "inferred  a  general 
battle" ;  that  he  was  in  "anticipation  of  an  order" ; 
and  that  he  ordered  his  first  and  third  brigades  to 
"concentrate"  on  the  second  at  Stonylonesome.78 
In  his  Autobiography  General  Wallace  says  that  he 
was  satisfied  before  six  o'clock,  from  the  firing  "up 
the  river",  that  the  battle  was  on;  and  he  says  that 
at  about  seven  o'clock,  his  concentration  of  brigades 
began.  The  official  records  show  that  this  order 
was  not  carried  out,  for  the  third  brigade  did  not 
move  from  Adamsville  until  about  two-thirty  after- 
noon, when  it  fell  in  behind  the  first  and  second 
brigades  on  the  march  toward  Snake  Creek  bridge, 
and  did  not  join  them  at  Stonylonesome. 

About  a  year  after  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  General 
Wallace  had  occasion  to  refer  to  the  movements  of 
his  division,  on  that  Sunday  in  explaining  to  the 
Department  Commander  the  reasons  for  the  late- 
ness of  his  arrival  on  the  field ;  and  in  his  explana- 
tion he  incidentally  referred  to  Grant's  call  at 
Crump's  Landing  on  Sunday  morning,  fixing  the 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  93 

time  at 1 1  about  nine  o  'clock '  '.79  General  Grant  and 
the  members  of  his  staff  fixed  the  time  at  seven  to 
seven-thirty  o'clock. 

No  special  importance  is  to  be  attached  to  this 
difference  in  time,  however,  for  it  had  no  important 
bearing  on  subsequent  events  —  it  is  mentioned 
only  because  it  may  justify  a  doubt  as  to  the  recol- 
lection of  General  Wallace  in  fixing  the  time  at 
which  he  received  final  marching  orders;  namely, 
"11 :30  a.  m."  It  was  the  belief  of  General  Grant 
and  members  of  his  staff  that  the  order  must  have 
been  received  from  a  half  hour  to  an  hour  earlier ; 
though  General  Wallace's  statement  is  now  gener- 
ally accepted.  The  form  of  order  sent  to  Wallace 
can  never  be  definitely  settled,  as  it  is  nowhere  a 
matter  of  record,  and  the  original  was  lost  in  the 
hands  of  General  Wallace,  or  through  the  fault  of 
his  Adjutant  General. 

During  the  year  after  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  there 
was  much  criticism  of  General  Wallace,  to  which 
he,  of  course,  made  defence.  And  so  General  Grant 
requested  his  Assistant  Adjutant  General,  Colonel 
Rawlins,  Colonel  McPherson,  Halleck's  chief  en- 
gineer, and  Captain  Rowley  of  his  staff,  each  of 
whom  had  knowledge  of  General  Wallace's  move- 
ments on  Sunday,  to  write  out  in  detail  their  recol- 
lections, to  be  submitted  to  the  Department  Com- 
mander. Each  wrote  quite  fully  about  one  year 


94  THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH 

after  the  battle,  Colonel  Rawlins  reproducing  from 
memory  the  order  dictated  by  him  as  he  claims,  to 
Captain  Baxter,  which  order  was  carried  by  the 
latter  to  Wallace.  Following  is  the  order  from 
memory : 

MAJOR-GENERAL  WALLACE  : 

You  will  move  forward  your  division  from  Crump 's  Land- 
ing, leaving  a  sufficient  force  to  protect  the  public  property  at 
that  place,  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  on  the  road  nearest  to  and 
parallel  with  the  river,  and  form  in  line  at  right  angles  with  the 
river,  immediately  in  rear  of  the  camp  of  Maj.  Gen.  C.  F. 
Smith 's  division  on  our  right,  and  there  await  further  orders.80 

Captain  Baxter  started  by  boat  to  deliver  the 
order  "not  later  than  nine  o'clock",  according  to 
Colonel  Rawlins,  and  reported  back  to  Grant  before 
"  12  o 'clock  m." 

In  his  official  report,  dated  April  12,  1862,  Gen- 
eral Wallace  says:  "At  11:30  o'clock  the  an- 
ticipated order  arrived,  directing  me  to  come  up 
and  take  position  on  the  right  of  the  army  and  form 
my  line  of  battle  at  a  right  angle  with  the  river." 81 
Writing  a  year  later  to  General  Halleck,  explaining 
the  reasons  for  his  late  arrival  on  the  field,  he  said : 
"At  exactly  11:30  a.  m.,  a  quartermaster  by  the 
name  of  Baxter  brought  me  an  order  in  writing  un- 
signed by  anybody",  the  bearer  of  the  order  ex- 
plaining that  he  received  it  verbally  and  put  it  in 
writing  while  on  the  boat. 

In  his  Autobiography,  General  Wallace  enlarges 


THE  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH  95 

somewhat  on  the  subject  of  this  order,  and  says  that 
it  was  written  on  paper  discolored  with  tobacco 
stains  and  bore  the  imprint  of  boot-heels;  and  he 
says  that  Baxter  told  him  that  the  paper  was  picked 
up  from  the  floor  of  the  ladies'  cabin,  on  the  steam- 
boat. The  original  order  having  been  lost,  Wallace 
gives  the  following  from  memory : 

You  will  leave  a  sufficient  force  at  Crump's  Landing  to 
guard  the  public  property  there :  with  the  rest  of  the  division 
march  and  form  junction  with  the  right  of  the  army.  Form 
line  of  battle  at  right  angles  with  the  river,  and  be  governed 
by  circumstances.82 

The  Rawlins  form  of  order  was  reproduced  from 
memory  within  one  year  after  the  event;  that  of 
Wallace,  many  years  after  —  possibly  forty  years. 
Aside  from  the  precise  road  mentioned  and  the  pre- 
cise position  on  the  field  designated  in  the  Rawlins 
order,  the  two  are  strikingly  similar  —  sufficiently 
so  to  suggest  that  the  former,  which  had  long  been 
in  print,  may  have  been  consulted  to  refresh  the 
memory  in  preparing  the  latter. 

Referring  again  to  the  events  of  Sunday  as  re- 
lated by  Colonel  Rawlins,  it  appears  that  about  an 
hour  after  Captain  Baxter  started  by  boat  with 
orders  to  General  Wallace,  Grant  sent  a  cavalry 
officer,  familiar  with  the  road,  with  a  verbal  message 
to  Wallace  "to  hurry  forward  with  all  possible  dis- 
patch." This  officer  reported  back  to  Grant,  be- 


96  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

tween  twelve  and  one  o  'clock,  that  Wallace  declined 
to  move  without  written  orders.  According  to  Rawl- 
ins,  Captain  Baxter  reported  back  about  12  o'clock ; 
that  he  delivered  the  orders  to  Wallace  at  about  ten 
o'clock;  that  Wallace  read  the  memorandum  hand- 
ed him  by  Captain  Baxter  and  "  appeared  de- 
lighted".83 

Immediately  after  the  report  of  the  cavalry  of- 
ficer that  Wallace  declined  to  move  without  written 
orders  (Baxter's  written  order  had  not  yet  been 
delivered),  Captain  Rowley  of  Grant's  staff  was 
ordered  to  take  the  cavalry  officer  and  two  orderlies 
and  carry  instructions  to  Wallace,  with  authority 
to  put  the  instructions  in  writing  and  sign  them,  if 
necessary.84 

Captain  Rowley's  account  of  this  incident  is  more 
in  detail  than  that  of  Colonel  Rawlins.  Rowley 
corroborates  Rawlins  as  to  the  report  of  the  cavalry 
officer  and  says  that  Grant,  after  hearing  the  re- 
port, turned  to  him  (Rowley)  and  said :  "Captain, 
you  will  proceed  to  Crump's  Landing  and  say  to 
General  Wallace  that  it  is  my  orders  that  he  bring 
his  division  up  at  once,  coming  up  by  the  River  road, 
crossing  Snake  Creek  on  the  bridge".  Captain 
Rowley  says  he  was  authorized  to  put  the  orders 
in  writing  and  properly  sign  the  same,  should 
General  Wallace  require  it.  He  was  instructed  to 
take  the  cavalry  officer  and  two  orderlies  with  him 


THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH  97 

with  the  further  instruction:  "see  that  you  do  not 
spare  horse  flesh."  Captain  Rowley  gives  the 
time  of  his  starting  on  this  mission  at  about  twelve- 
thirty  o  'clock.  Colonel  Rawlins  fixes  it  at "  not  later 
than  1  o'clock  p.  m." 

Captain  Rowley's  party  rode  directly  to  Wal- 
lace's headquarters  at  Crump's  Landing,  to  find 
"no  signs  of  a  camp  except  one  baggage  wagon 
that  was  just  leaving. "  8e  (The  brigade  had  marched 
west  to  Stonylonesome  in  the  morning.)  Getting 
directions  from  the  driver  of  the  wagon,  the  party 
followed  the  road  taken  by  Wallace  and  overtook 
the  rear  of  the  division  some  five  or  six  miles  out. 
The  division  was  "at  a  rest,  sitting  on  each  side  of 
the  road".  Riding  forward  to  the  head  of  the  col- 
umn, Wallace  was  found  "sitting  upon  his  horse, 
surrounded  by  his  staff".  Although  it  is  not  so 
stated,  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  the  division  was  at 
rest  while  the  cavalry  was  scouting  to  the  front,  as 
Wallace  believed  that  he  was  approaching  the 
crossing  of  Owl  Creek,  near  the  right  of  the  army 
as  it  was  in  the  morning,  and  where  he  might  ex- 
pect trouble. 

Captain  Rowley  delivered  his  orders  and  stated 
that  it  had  been  reported  to  Grant  that  he  (Wal- 
lace) had  declined  to  march  without  written  orders, 
which  according  to  Rowley,  Wallace  denounced  as 
a ' l  damned  lie ! "  Wallace  claimed  that  he  had  taken 


98  THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH 

the  "only  road  he  knew  anything  about,"87  leading 
in  the  direction  of  the  right  of  the  army.  On  learn- 
ing the  real  situation,  Wallace  ordered  his  division 
to  counter-march  for  the  purpose  of  reaching  the 
river  road  by  a  short-cut  if  possible.  Captain  Row- 
ley remained  with  the  division,  acting  as  guide. 

When  Captain  Rowley  left  the  field  with  orders 
to  Wallace,  it  was  supposed  that  the  head  of  the 
column  would  be  found  only  a  short  distance  north 
of  Snake  Creek  bridge,  and  that  Wallace  would 
soon  be  in  the  precise  position  where  he  was  expect- 
ed to  be,  and  where  his  presence  was  most  needed. 
Two  o'clock  came,  but  no  information  from  Wal- 
lace. Grant  then  sent  two  of  the  principal  members 
of  his  staff,  Colonel  Rawlins,  Assistant  Adjutant 
General,  and  Colonel  McPherson,  Chief  Engineer, 
to  find  the  lost  division. 

These  officers  rode  directly  to  Crump's  Landing, 
not  knowing  whether  the  division  had  left  its  camp. 
Following  directions  given  them  there,  they  came 
upon  the  division  counter-marching  on  a  cross-road 
to  the  river  road,  at  about  three-thirty  afternoon. 
Colonel  Rawlins  repeated  to  Wallace  the  reported 
refusal  to  march  without  written  orders,  and  Wal- 
lace repeated  the  denial.  In  regard  to  the  road 
taken,  Wallace  said,  according  to  Rawlins,  that  his 
guide  had  misled  him. 

Soon  after  Rawlins  and  McPherson  came  up  with 


THE  BATTLE   OF   SHILOH  99 

the  head  of  the  column  it  was  halted,  as  Rawlins 
states  it,  "for  a  considerable  length  of  time,  to  en- 
able it  to  close  up  and  rest".  There  was  another 
delay  when  near  Snake  Creek  bridge  "for  full  half 
an  hour"  while  changing  the  position  of  the  artil- 
lery in  the  column.88 

The  three  officers,  Rawlins,  McPherson,  and 
Rowley,  agree  in  stating  that  the  march  of  the  col- 
umn was  very  slow,  and  that  no  urging  of  the  terms 
of  Grants'  order  or  the  seriousness  of  the  situation 
seemed  to  have  any  effect.  According  to  Rawlins, 
the  speed  was  less  than  "a  mile  and  a  half  an  hour" 
after  he  joined  the  column,  though  "the  roads  were 
in  fine  condition;  he  was  marching  light;  his  men 
were  in  buoyant  spirits,  ....  and  eager  to  get  for- 
ward."89 

Whatever  the  form  of  the  order  from  General 
Grant  to  General  Wallace,  and  however  it  may  have 
been  interpreted,  Wallace's  march  began  from 
Stonylonesome  at  twelve  o'clock,  noon,  with  two 
brigades,  over  the  Shunpike  road  toward  Owl  Creek 
bridge,  the  third  brigade  falling  in  the  rear  where 
the  road  intersects  from)  Adamsville.  Captain  Row- 
ley came  up  to  the  head  of  the  column  "at  rest", 
north  of  and  overlooking  Clear  Creek  valley,  not 
Owl  Creek  as  Wallace  supposed  —  he  was  still  more 
than  three  miles  from  Owl  Creek,  and  the  rear  of 
the  column  was  still  at  Adamsville.  The  counter- 


100  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH 

march  began  from  the  north  side  of  Clear  Creek,  at 
a  point  marked  " Smith's"  (Map  VIII).  It  was 
necessary  for  the  head  of  the  column  to  march  back 
about  two  and  a  half  miles  to  find  a  cross-road,  then 
about  the  same  distance  on  the  cross-road,  before 
the  rear  could  move ;  so  it  was  well  along  in  the  af- 
ternoon when  the  last  files  of  the  third  brigade  left 
Adamsville.  Colonel  Rawlins  and  Colonel  Mc- 
Pherson  came  up  with  Wallace  on  the  cross-road  at 
about  three-thirty  afternoon,  as  heretofore  stated. 

From  a  glance  at  the  map  (VIII)  showing  the 
roads  north  of  Snake  Creek  and  the  relation  of  the 
roads  to  the  battle  field,  it  appears  that  the  shortest 
possible  route  from  Wallace's  camps  to  the  right  of 
the  army  (as  it  was  even  on  Sunday  morning)  was 
by  the  river  road  and  Snake  Creek  bridge  (Wallace 
bridge  on  map).  Not  only  was  the  road  by  Owl 
Creek  bridge  much  longer,  but  the  crossing  was 
more  hazardous  in  case  the  enemy  succeeded  in  se- 
curing the  crossing  and  planting  a  battery,  for  the 
approach  from  the  North  was  through  a  swampy 
valley,  heavily  timbered  and  with  dense  under- 
growth, along  a  narrow  road  where  deployment 
was  impossible  and  where  the  column  would  be  ex- 
posed to  direct  artillery  fire  for  a  distance  of  nearly 
a  mile. 

Had  General  Wallace  been  familiar  with  the 
roads  covering  the  territory  which  it  was  his  special 


THE  BATTLE  OP  SHILOH  101 

province  to  guard,  no  guide  could  have  misled  him, 
and  he  would  not  have  said  that  he  was  on  "the  only 
road  he  knew  anything  about".  His  position  at 
Crump 's  Landing  was  as  much  exposed  to  attack  as 
was  the  camp  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  he  was  as 
likely  to  need  support  as  he  was  to  be  called  on  for 
support.  It  was  of  the  utmost  importance  for  the 
safety  of  his  own  command  that  he  know  the  short- 
est and  best  road  between  the  two  camps. 

Forty  years  after  the  event  General  Wallace  was 
forced  to  confess  that  he  had  all  that  time  been  la- 
boring under  a  mistake  as  to  the  position  of  the 
head  of  his  column  when  the  order  was  given  to 
counter-march.  He  had  all  this  time  supposed  that 
he  was  overlooking  Owl  Creek  at  the  right  of  Sher- 
man ?s  lines  when  Captain  Rowley  came  up  and 
found  his  division  "at  rest",  while  his  cavalry  was 
scouting  to  the  front.  Instead  of  overlooking  Owl 
Creek,  he  was  overlooking  the  valley  of  Clear  Creek 
three  or  four  miles  to  the  north.  Of  these  facts 
General  Wallace  was  convinced,  not  long  before  his 
death,  by  a  personal  inspection  of  the  territory  and 
the  roads  over  which  his  division  marched,  in  com- 
pany with  the  Secretary  and  Historian  of  the  Shiloh 
National  Military  Park  Commission,  several  of  his 
own  officers,  with  citizens  living  in  the  locality,  and 
with  a  Confederate  cavalry  officer  who  was  watching 
his  movements  on  that  Sundav. 


102         THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH 

Strangely,  General  Wallace  allowed  this  con- 
fessed error  to  stand  in  his  Autobiography,  with 
only  partial  correction. 

It  seems  not  to  be  generally  known,  though  it  has 
been  a  matter  of  official  record  since  1863,  that  Gen- 
eral Wallace  in  view  of  General  Grant's  criticism 
of  his  (Wallace's)  conduct  at  Shiloh,  asked  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  a  court  of  inquiry.  The  date  of 
the  request  was  July  18th,  1863 ;  but  on  September 
16th  following,  the  Secretary  of  War  was  asked  to 
"suspend  action  in  the  matter",  General  Wallace 
stating  that  he  might  be  able  to  "  satisfy  General 
Grant  upon  the  points  involved".90  It  was  on  the 
advice  of  General  Sherman  that  the  request  for  a 
court  of  inquiry  was  withdrawn,  and  the  request 
was  never  renewed,  though  General  Grant  had 
found  no  reason  to  modify  his  original  criticism, 
down  to  the  time  of  writing  the  chapter  on  Shiloh, 
for  his  Memoirs.91  After  the  writing  of  that  chap- 
ter, however,  a  letter  came  into  General  Grant's 
hands,  written  by  General  Lew.  Wallace  to  General 
W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  dated  April  5, 1862  (correct  date 
April  4th) .  In  this  letter  General  Grant  finds  rea- 
sons for  "materially"  modifying  the  criticisms  up- 
on General  Wallace,  as  they  appear  in  the  chapter 
itself,  appending  a  foot-note  thereto  by  way  of 
explanation.92 

The  writer  hereof  is  impressed  with  the  idea  that 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH  103 

it  was  the  promptings  of  General  Grant's  generous 
nature,  rather  than  the  contents  of  the  letter  that 
prompted  the  foot-note.  It  is  not  entirely  clear,  in 
view  of  the  admissions  made  by  General  Wallace 
in  his  Autobiography,  that  the  letter  from  General 
Lew.  Wallace  to  General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  does 
not  furnish  additional  ground  for  censure.  At  the 
moment  of  writing  the  letter  the  author  of  it  must 
have  been  ''simmering"  in  his  mind  the  knowledge 
that  the  Confederate  army  was  then  on  the  march 
to  attack  Grant;  and  yet  there  was  no  mention  in 
the  letter  of  that  important  fact.  The  reader  must 
draw  his  own  conclusions. 


ILLUSTRATIVE  MAPS 


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MAP   I — SHOWING   THE   TERRITORY   OVER   AVHICH   GENERAL   GRANT   OPERATED   FROM 
SEPTEMBER  4,  1861,  TO  THE  TIME  OP  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH,  TOGETHER  WITH  THE 

LOCATION  OF   THE   IMPORTANT   PLACES    MENTIONED   IN   THE   TEXT.      IT   ALSO   SHOWS   THE 
ADVANCE    OF    BUELL 'S    ARMY    FROM    NASHVILLE    TO    SlIILOH. 


MAP  II — A  VIEW  OF  THE  PLATEAU  ABOVE  PlTTSBURG  LANDING,  .SHOWING  THE  PRINCIPAL 
ROADS,   CREEKS,   CULTIVATED   FIELDS,   LOCATION   OF   CAMPS,   WOODED   CONDITION,    ETC. 


MAP  III — SHOWING  THE  CONFEDERATE  LINES  AS  THEY  WERE  ON  SATURDAY  NIGHT; 
FRALEY  FIELD  WHERE  THE  PICKET  FIGHT  OCCURRED  ON  SUNDAY  MORNING.  AND  THE 

ADVANCE  TO  ATTACK.  ON  THE  UNION  SIDE  THE  MAP  SHOWS  FIRST  AND  SECOND  POSI- 
TIONS OF  PRENTISS  AND  STUART,  AND  FIRST  POSITIONS  OF  SHERMAN,  MCCLERNAND, 
WALLACE.  AND  HURLBUT. 


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MAP  \'T — SHOWING  KUGGI.ES'S  BATTERY  (62  GUNS)  BOMBARDING  THE  HORNETS'  NEST, 
AND  THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  TIME  OF  THE  SURRENDER  AT  THAT  POINT.  THE  LINES 
FACING  EACH  OTHER  ACROSS  DlLL  BRANCH  WERE  THE  LAST  LINES  OF  THE  DAY,  SUNDAY. 
THE  BATTERIES  IN  GRANT'S  LINE  WERE  ALL  THERE  AS  REPRESENTED:  (1)  MARKGRAF  6; 
(2)  MUNCH  5;  (3)  POWELL  5;  (4)  SILFVERSPARRE  4;  (5)  MCALLISTER  2;  (6)  STONE 
4;  (7)  DRESSER  2;  (8)  MANN  3;  (9)  SIEGE  GUNS  6;  (10)  RICHARDSON  4;  (11)  NISPEL 
2;  (12)  WELKER  3;  (13)  HICKENLOOPER  2;  (14)  BOUTON  4  ('?).  Two  OTHER  BAT- 
TERIES WERE  SOMEWHERE  ALONG  THE  LINE,  BUT  NEVER  HAVING  BEEN  DEFINITELY  LOCAT- 
ED ARE  NOT  REPRESENTED.  (a)  3<)TH  INDIANA  SUPPORTING  STONE'S  BATTERY. 


MAP  VII — THE  MOVEMENTS  ON  MONDAY  THE  "TH  ARE  so  LITTLE  COMPLICATED  AS  TO 

BE  EASILY   TRACED,   WITHOUT  ANALYSIS. 


MAP  VIII — ROADS  NORTH  OF  OWL  AND  SNAKE  CREEKS  SHOWING  LEW.  WALLACE'S 

ADVANCE  FROM   CRUMP  '§  LANDING,  S'fONYLONESOME,  AND   ADAMSVILLE. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES 

^reeley's  The  American  Conflict,  Vol.  II,  pp.  58-61. 

2  Cist's  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  pp.  74,  75. 

3  Cist's  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  p.  77. 

4  The  Century  Magazine,  Vol.  XXXI,  p.  749. 

5  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  VII, 
p.  561. 

6  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  VII, 
p.  121. 

7  War  of  the  Rebellion :  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  VII, 
p.  593. 

8  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  VII, 
p.  587. 

9  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  VII, 
pp.  574,  576. 

10  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  VII, 
p.  933. 

11  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  VII, 
pp.  594,  599,  612. 

12  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  VII, 
p.  660. 

13  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X. 
Part  II,  p.  38. 


118  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH 

14  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  VII, 
p.  628. 

15  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  VII, 
p.  674. 

16  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  VII, 
pp.  680,  682. 

17  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  pp.  3-5. 

18  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  pp.  21-26. 

19  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  pp.  9,  10. 

20  War  of  the  Rebellion  :  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  8. 

21  War  of  the  Rebellion  :  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  25. 

22  Wallace  's  Autobiography,  Vol.  I,  pp.  446,  451. 

23  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  46. 

24  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  49. 

25  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  51. 


26  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  pp.  50-51. 

27  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  55. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  119 

28  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  62. 

29  The  several  requests  to  be  relieved  of  command  in  Hal- 
leek 's  department  bear  date  of  March  7,  9,  and  11.  —  War  of 
the  Rebellion.-  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X,  Part  II,  pp. 
15,  21,  30. 

30  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  25. 

31  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  33. 

32  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  pp.  42,  51,  77. 

33  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  47. 

34  The  following  is  the  itinerary  of  General  Nelson 's  march 
from  Columbia,  as  given  by  Colonel  Ammen,  commanding  the 
advance  brigade:    March  30,  4  miles;  March  31,  10  miles; 
April  1,  14  miles;  April  2,  16  miles;  April  3,  15  miles;  April 
4,  101/2  miles;  April  5,  91/2  miles.  —  Ammen 's  Diary  in  War 
of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X,  Part  I,  p. 
330. 

35  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  pp.  94,  95. 

36  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  94. 

37  Proceedings  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
Vol.  XIV-XVI,  p.  71. 

38  Proceedings  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
Vol.  XIV-XVI,  p.  77. 


120         THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH 

39  Quoted  by  Major  D.  W.  Reed  in  a  paper  published  in  the 
Proceedings  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  Vol. 
XXXVI,  p.  216. 

40  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  181. 

41  Wallace 's  Autobiography,  Vol.  I,  pp.  454-456. 

42  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X. 
Part  I,  p.  278. 

43  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  603. 

44  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  464. 

45  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  603. 

46  Since  writing  the  above  the  author  has  learned  from 
General  Charles  Morton,  who  helped  to  carry  the  body  from 
the  field,  that  Major  Powell  was  killed  later  in  the  day  — 
about  noon,  at  the  Hornets'  Nest. 

47  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  294. 

48  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  581. 

49  Johnston's  Life  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  p.  620. 

50  Reed's  Campaigns  and  Battles  of  the  Twelfth  Regiment 
Iowa  Veteran  Volunteer  Infantry,  p.  50. 

51  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  475. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  121 

52  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  472. 

53  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  323. 

64  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  pp.  550-551. 

65  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  555. 

56  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  334. 

57  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,  Vol.  XVI,  p.  297. 

58  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,  Vol.  XVI,  pp.  300, 
301. 

69  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,  Vol.  XVI,  p.  307. 
80  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,  Vol.  XVI,  p.  316. 

61  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,  Vol.  XVI,  pp.  316- 
317. 

62  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  95. 

63  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Vol.  LII,  Part  I, 
p.  232. 

64  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  pp.  95-96. 

65  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  292. 

66  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  323. 


122  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH 

67  War  of  the  Rebellion :  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  323. 

68  The  Century  Magazine,  Vol.  XXXI,  p.  771. 

69  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  pp.  97, 104. 

70  Heed's  The  Battle  of  Shiloh,  p.  98. 

71  Reed's  The  Battle  of  Shiloh,  p.  110. 
'2  Reed's  The  Battle  of  Shiloh,  p.  112. 

73  Reed's  The  Battle  of  Shiloh,  p.  110. 

74  Reed's  The  Battle  of  Shiloh,  p.  98. 
76  Reed's  The  Battle  of  Shiloh,  p.  102. 

76  Reed's  The  Battle  of  Shiloh,  p.  110. 

77  Reed's  The  Battle  of  Shiloh,  p.  23. 

78  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  170. 

79  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  175. 

80  War  of  the  Rebellion :  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  185. 

81  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  170. 

82  Wallace's  Autobiography,  Vol.  I,  p.  463. 

83  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  pp.  185-186. 

In  1886  Captain  Baxter  related  his  recollections  of  this 
incident  for  publication  in  The  New  York  Mail  and  Express 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  123 

(November  4,  1886)  which  are  republished  in  Battles  and 
Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  Vol.  I,  p.  607,  as  follows : 

"On  Sunday,  between  the  hours  of  8  and  9  o'clock  a.  m., 
April  6,  1862,  Adjutant  General  Rawlins,  of  General  Grant's 
staff,  requested  me  to  go  to  Crump's  Landing  (five  miles  be- 
low) and  order  General  Lew  Wallace  to  march  his  command 
at  once  by  the  river  road  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  join  the 
army  on  the  right.  At  the  same  time,  General  Rawlins  dic- 
tated the  order,  which  was  written  by  myself  and  signed  by 
General  Rawlins. 

"On  meeting  General  Wallace,  I  gave  the  order  verbally, 
also  handed  to  him  the  written  order.  General  Wallace  said 
he  was  waiting  for  orders,  had  heard  the  firing  all  the  morning, 
and  was  ready  to  move  with  his  command  immediately  — 
knew  the  road  and  had  put  it  in  good  order. ' ' 

84  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  pp.  185-186. 

85  War  of  the  Rebellion :  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  179. 

86  War  of  the  Rebellion :  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  179. 

87  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  p.  180. 

88  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  187. 

89  War  of  the  Rebellion :  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  II,  p.  188. 

90  War  of  the  Rebellion:  Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  X, 
Part  I,  pp.  188-190. 

91  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  8.  Grant,  Vol.  I,  pp.  337-338. 

92  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant,  Vol.  I,  p.  351. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


ABBOTT,  J.  S.  C.,  sensational  ac- 
count of  Battle  of  Shiloh  by,  13 

Adamsville  (Tennessee),  brigade 
of  Wallace's  division  at,  91,  92, 
99,  100 

Ammen,  Colonel  Jacob,  brigade 
commanded  by,  76;  reference  to, 
85,  119 

Anderson,  General  Patton,  brigade 
commanded  by,  60 

Appier,  Colonel  Jesse  J.,  58;  dis- 
appearance of,  from  field,  59 

Artillery,  use  of,  in  battle,  70,  71, 
73,  74 

BARK  road,  50 

Baxter,  Captain,  order  carried  to 
Wallace  by,  94,  95,  96;  recol- 
lections by,  122,  123 

Bear  Creek,  29 

Beauregard,  General  P.  G.  T.,  14, 
16,  27,  51,  88;  concentration  of 
army  under,  36 ;  attempt  to  place 
blame  on,  77 

Belknap,  Major  William  W.,  6 

Bell  (Scout),  news  brought  by,  46 

Belmont,  Battle  of,  23 

Bloody  Pond,  69 

Bowen,  General  John  S.,  brigade 
commanded  by,  62,  64,  65 

Bowling  Green  (Kentucky),  22,  25 

Bragg,  General  Braxton,  statement 
by,  54;  reference  to,  60;  com- 
mand assumed  by,  66;  operations 


of,  after  capture  of  Hornets' 
Nest,  74 

Breckenridge,  General  John  C., 
Confederate  reserve  under,  64, 
65 

Buckland,  Colonel  Ealph  P.,  re- 
eonnoitering  by,  39,  40 ;  account 
of  events  preceding  battle  by, 
39-41;  reprimand  to,  40,  45; 
brigade  commanded  by,  59,  60 

Buell,  General  Don  Carlos,  account 
of  Battle  of  Shiloh  by,  14,  19- 
21;  credit  for  saving  battle 
given  to,  17,  18 ;  arrival  of  army 
of,  on  field,  18,  82-89,  84;  ref- 
erence to,  24,  26,  27;  commun- 
ications between  Halleck  and, 
25;  disagreement  between  Hal- 
leck and,  27,  28;  Halleck  placed 
in  command  over,  28;  Grant  or- 
dered to  connect  with,  33 ;  move- 
ments of,  35-38;  plan  of  Con- 
federates to  defeat,  51;  part 
played  by,  in  Battle  of  Shiloh, 
72-77,  79;  note  from  Grant  to, 
83;  order  held  up  by,  85;  atti- 
tude of,  toward  Grant's  orders, 
86,  87;  attitude  of,  toward  bat- 
tle, 87;  position  of  army  of,  in 
Monday's  battle,  88 

CAIBO  (Illinois),  headquarters  of 
Grant  at,  22;  reference  to,  23 


128 


INDEX 


Carpenter  (Scout),  news  brought 
by,  46 

Chalmers,  General  James  K.,  bri- 
gade commanded  by,  56,  61,  62, 
65,  74,  75,  76 

Chattanooga  (Tennessee),  27;  im- 
portance of,  28 

Cist,  Henry  M.,  errors  in  account 
of  Battle  of  Shiloh  by,  17 

Clarksville  (Tennessee),  occupa- 
tion of,  26 

Clear  Creek,  99,  100,  101 

Cleburne,  General  Patrick  B.,  bri- 
gade commanded  by,  59,  60 

Columbia  (Tennessee),  Buell's  ad- 
vance at,  28,  35,  36;  itinerary 
of  Nelson's  march  from,  119 

Columbus  (Kentucky),  22,  25;  im- 
portance of,  23;  evacuation  of, 
27 

Confederate  army,  description  and 
objective  of,  51,  52;  condition 
of,  at  close  of  Sunday's  battle. 
80;  number  of  troops  in,  89,  90; 
losses  in,  90,  91 

Confederates,  number  of,  in  Battle 
of  Shiloh,  15,  16,  31;  weak  point 
in  line  of,  22;  evacuation  of 
Columbus  by,  27;  new  line  es- 
tablished by,  27;  Wallace's 
knowledge  of  movements  of,  45, 
46;  resistance  met  by,  56;  plan 
of,  to  seize  Landing,  61;  diffi- 
culties confronting,  74;  "lost 
opportunity"  of,  77-79;  stub- 
born fighting  by,  89 

Corinth  (Mississippi),  condition  of 
Confederates  after  evacuation  of. 
14;  importance  of,  27;  reference 
to,  28,  29,  31;  movement  of 
Confederates  from,  32,  39,  46, 
51;  expedition  toward,  33;  diffi- 


culty in  attacking,  33;  concen- 
tration of  Confederates  at,  36,  51 

Corinth  road,  50,  57,  63,  69 

Crittenden,  General  Thomas  L., 
division  commanded  by,  86 ; 
charge  by  regiment  under,  88 

Crump's  Landing,  Wallace's  divi- 
sion at,  18,  30,  31,  32,  45,  91; 
reference  to,  82,  98,  123;  stop 
made  by  Grant  at,  92;  arrival 
of  Rowley  at,  97;  exposed  posi- 
tion of  camp  at,  101 

Cumberland  River,  importance  of 
line  of,  21-23 

DECATUB  (Alabama),  27,  36 
Dickey,  Colonel  T.  Lyle,  desire  of, 

to  reconnoiter,  41 
Dill  Branch,  72,  73,  74,  76 
Dodge,  General  Grenville  M.,  7 
Duck  River,  28,  35,  36,  37 
Duncan  Field,  63,  69,  71;  number 

of  dead  in,  68 

EASTPORT  (Tennessee),  29 

Fiske,  John,  errors  in  account  of 

Battle  of  Shiloh  by,  15-17 
Foote,  Commodore  A.  H.,  advice  of, 

24 
Fort  Donelson,  Confederates  forced 

back    to,    23;    capture    of,    26; 

events   after   capture   of,   27-35, 

51;  reference  to,  28,  47 
Fort    Henry,    Confederates    forced 

back    to,    23;    report    of    Smith 

concerning,   23,  24;    capture   of, 

by  Grant,  24,  25;    events  after 

capture  of,  26;  reference  to,  28; 

Grant  at,  29 ;  expedition  from,  30 
Fraley  Field,  53 
Fremont,  General  John  C.,  22 


INDEX 


129 


GIBSON,  Colonel  Eandall  L.,  bri- 
gade commanded  by,  68 

Gladden,  General  Adley  EL,  bri- 
gade commanded  by,  56,  62,  65; 
death  of,  56 

Grant,  General  Frederick  D.,  7 

Grant,  General  Ulysses  S.,  prej- 
udice against,  14;  policy  wrong- 
ly attributed  to,  15;  number  of 
guns  in  line  of,  16;  dispatch  of, 
misquoted,  17;  reinforcements  to 
army  of,  17;  headquarters  of, 
at  Cairo,  22;  result  of  prompt 
action  of,  23;  offense  to  Hal- 
leek  by,  26,  27;  orders  from 
Halleck  to,  28,  29,  32,  33;  sus- 
pension of,  from  command,  29; 
expedition  planned  without  con- 
sultation with,  30;  restoration 
of,  to  command,  30,  32;  orders 
issued  by,  33;  anxiety  of,  34; 
rejection  of  advice  of,  35;  Buell 
ordered  to  join,  36;  couriers  sent 
to  Buell  by,  36;  Buell's  arrival 
not  known  to,  37,  38;  authority 
of,  in  ease  of  attack,  38,  85; 
Wallace's  knowledge  of  attack 
on,  45,  46;  failure  of  Wallace  to 
send  information  to,  46,  47 ;  plan 
of  Confederates  to  defeat,  51; 
failure  of  Confederates  to  sur- 
prise, 52;  new  line  formed  by, 
72;  strength  of  position  of,  74; 
blame  for  failure  to  defeat,  77; 
condition  of  army  of,  at  close  of 
Sunday's  battle,  79,  80;  trans- 
fer in  headquarters  of,  82;  in- 
structions to  Nelson  from,  82,  83, 
84,  85;  note  to  Buell  from,  83; 
movements  of,  behind  lines,  86; 
attitude  of  Buell  toward  orders 
of,  86,  87;  position  of  army  of, 


in  Monday's  battle,  88;  reason 
for  failure  of,  to  pursue  Con- 
federates, 89;  number  of  troops 
in  army  of,  89,  90;  losses  in 
army  of,  90,  91;  orders  to  Wal- 
lace from,  92-99;  criticism  of 
Wallace  by,  102;  modification  of 
criticisms  by,  102 ;  generosity  of, 
103 

Greeley,  Horace,  errors  in  account 
of  Battle  of  Shiloh  by,  13 

Grose,  Colonel  William,  statements 
by,  76 

HAHN,  William  J.,  acknowledg- 
ments to,  11 

Halleck,  General  Henry  W.,  report 
by,  14;  waiting  policy  of,  15; 
reference  to,  23, 24,  31,  34,  36,  37, 
85,  94;  communications  between 
Buell  and,  25;  desire  of,  for 
more  troops,  25,  26;  disagree- 
ment between  Buell  and,  27,  28; 
command  of  two  departments  as- 
sumed by,  28;  orders  to  Grant 
from,  28,  29,  32,  33,  38;  orders 
to  Buell  from,  35,  36;  adherence 
to  orders  of,  44,  45 ;  effect  of  in- 
structions of,  89 

Hamburg  and  Purdy  road,  50,  57 

Hamburg  and  Savannah  road,  50, 
51,  66,  69,  72,  73 

Hardcastle,  Major  Aaron  B.,  ac- 
count of  skirmish  by,  53,  54 

Hardee,  General  William  J.,  corps 
commanded  by,  59 

Harris,  Governor  Isham  G.,  65 

Headley,  Joel  Tyler,  errors  in  his- 
tory by,  14 

Henderson,  David  B.,  6 

Hildebrand,  Colonel  Jesse,  brigade 
commanded  by,  58,  59,  60 


130 


INDEX 


Hindman,  General  Thomas  C.,  bri- 
gade commanded  by,  68 

Holman,  T.  W.,  acknowledgments 
to,  11 

Hornets'  Nest,  Iowa  troops  in,  5; 
errors  relative  to,  19;  reference 
to,  64,  80,  87;  description  of 
fight  at,  67-72;  number  captured 
in,  71,  72;  importance  of,  72; 
surprise  of  Confederates  at  small 
number  in,  72;  prisoners  taken 
in,  91;  death  of  Powell  at,  120 

Humboldt  (Tennessee),  29 

Hurlbut,  General  Stephen  A.,  divi- 
sion commanded  by,  31,  32;  ref- 
erence to,  50,  62,  64,  65,  66; 
losses  in  division  commanded  by, 
90 

ILLINOIS,  troops  of,  in  Battle  of 
Shiloh,  40,  61,  63,  66,  69 

Indiana,  troops  of,  in  Battle  of 
Shiloh,  73,  76 

Iowa,  troops  of,  in  Battle  of 

Shiloh,  5,  63,  64,  66,  67,  70,  87 

JACKSON,  General  John  K.,  brigade 
commanded  by,  61,  62,  65,  74,  75 

Jackson  (Tennessee),  29,  31 

Johnson,  General  Bushrod  R.,  bri- 
gade commanded  by,  60 

Johnston,  General  Albert  Sidney, 
criticism  of,  16,  50;  death  of, 
18,  19,  65,  66;  errors  in  state- 
ments relative  to,  19;  command 
of  Confederates  assumed  by,  27, 
51;  reference  to,  28;  concentra- 
tion of  army  under,  36;  plan  of, 
to  join  Beauregard,  51;  Confed- 
erate movements  directed  by,  62; 
story  concerning,  65;  biography 
of,  67 ;  number  of  troops  in  army 


of,  89,  90;  losses  in  army  of,  90, 
91 

Johnston,  William  Preston,  state- 
ments by,  67,  68 

Jones's  Field,  64 

Jordan,  Colonel  Thomas,  discussion 
of  "lost  opportunity"  by,  77, 
78,  79 

KING,  Major  John  H.,  wound  re- 
ceived by,  55 

LAUMAN,  General  Jacob  D.,  brigade 
commanded  by,  62 

Lick  Creek,  crossing  of,  57;  ref- 
erence to,  61 

Little  Log  Meeting  House,  69 

MCARTHUR,  General  John,  brigade 

commanded  by,  63;  reference  to, 

65,  66 
McClellan,  General  George  B.,  25, 

28 
McClernand,  General  John  A.,  15, 

62,  63,  66;   division  commanded 

by,    32,    60;    losses    in    division 

commanded  by,  90 
McCook,    General    Alexander    M., 

division  commanded  by,  86 
McDowell,  Colonel  John  A.,  brigade 

commanded  by,  60 
McPherson,  Colonel  James  B.,  41, 

47,   93,   100;   orders  to  Wallace 

carried  by,  98,  99 
Mann,  Lieutenant,  wound  received 

by,  55 

Mason,  Colonel  Rodney,  61 
Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad, 

27,  31,  34,  51 
Michigan,  troops  of,   in  Battle  of 

Shiloh,  55 


INDEX 


131 


Miller,    Colonel    Madison,    brigade 

commanded  by,  55 
Mississippi,  troops  of,  in  Battle  of 

Shiloh,  59 
Missouri,   troops  of,   in   Battle  of 

Shiloh,   42,   43,   44,   52,  53,   54, 

55,  70 

Mobile  and  Ohio  Bailroad,  27,  30 
Moore,  Colonel  David,  reenforcing 

party  under,  52,  53,  54;   wound 

received  by,  55 
Morton,  General  Charles,  7,  120 

NASHVILLE  (Tennessee),  25,  28; 
occupation  of,  26,  27;  evacua- 
tion of,  27,  51 ;  Buell  on  march 
from,  51 

Neal,  W.  A.,  account  of  action  of 
Peabody  by,  42 

Nelson,  General  William,  division 
commanded  by,  16,  19,  26,  36, 
37,  76,  85;  number  of  troops 
brought  into  battle  by,  17;  state- 
ments by,  concerning  artillery, 
73;  Grant's  instructions  to,  82, 
83,  84,  85;  reference  to,  86; 
charge  by  regiment  under,  88; 
itinerary  of  march  of,  119 

Newhard,  James  M.,  account  of  ac- 
tion of  Peabody  by,  42 

Nichols,  Captain  F.  C.,  letter  to 
Peabody  from,  43,  44;  reference 
to,  53 

Nott,  Surgeon  J.  C.,  statement  by, 
78 

OHIO,     troops    of,     in    Battle    of 

Shiloh,  40,  58,  59,  61 
Ohio,  Army  of  the,  76;  losses  in, 

90,  91 
Owl  Creek,  49,  57,  60,  61,  97,  99, 

100,  101 

(A 


PADUCAH  (Kentucky),  expedition 
to,  22;  reference  to,  23 

Paris,  Comte  de,  account  of  Battle 
of  Shiloh  by,  17 

Paris  (Tennessee),  29 

Peabody,  Colonel  Everett,  11;  re- 
connoitering  party  sent  out  by, 
42,  43,  52;  death  of,  43,  56; 
reprimand  to,  by  Prentiss,  43, 
44,  45;  brigade  commanded  by, 
55 

Peabody,  F.  E.,  letter  to,  43,  44 

Peach  Orchard,  62,  64,  66,  87 

Pittsburg  Landing,  first  regiment 
to  disembark  at,  5;  description 
of  camp  at,  13;  ranking  officer 
at,  15;  reference  to,  18,  34,  36, 
101,  123 ;  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
at,  21;  attack  on  camp  at,  30; 
troops  in  camp  at,  31,  47;  rea- 
sons for  conditions  at,  35;  Buell 
ordered  to  concentrate  at,  36; 
description  of,  49,  50;  Sher- 
man's division  in  camp  at,  57; 
plan  of  Confederates  to  seize, 
61;  Wallace's  division  at,  63; 
Grant's  headquarters  moved  to, 
82;  arrival  of  Buell  at,  84 

Polk,  General  Leonidaa,  60 

Pond,  Colonel  Preston,  Jr.,  brigade 
commanded  by,  60 

Powell,  Major  James  E.,  11;  death 
of,  43,  56,  120;  reconnoitering 
party  led  by,  43,  52-54 

Prentiss,  General  Benjamin  M., 
division  commanded  by,  13,  50, 
62,  64,  66;  reference  to,  14,  16, 
18,  42,  48,  55,  57,  59,  70;  re- 
connoitering party  sent  out  from 
division  under,  15,  52;  recon- 
noitering party  sent  out  without 
knowledge  of,  42;  Peabody  rep- 


132 


INDEX 


rimanded  by,  43,  44,  45;   readi- 
ness  of   division   under,   for   at- 
tack,  44,  45;    losses  in   division 
commanded  by,  90 
Purdy  road,  89 

RAWLINS,  Captain  J.  A.,  93,  95, 
96,  97,  100,  123;  order  repro- 
duced by,  94;  orders  to  Wallace 
carried  by,  98,  99 

Reed,  D.  W.,  6,  120;  researches 
by,  10;  acknowledgments  to,  11; 
description  of  battle  at  Hornets ' 
Nest  by,  68,  69 

Reid,  Whitelaw,  praise  of  Buell  by, 
17,  18 

Rhea  Field,  53,  55,  58 

Rich,  Joseph  W.,  qualifications  of, 
for  writing  history  of  battle,  6, 
7;  author's  preface  by,  9 

Ropes,  John  Codman,  errors  in  ac- 
count of  Battle  of  Shiloh  by,  14, 
89;  failure  of,  to  understand 
topography  of  field,  50 

Rowley,  Captain  William  R.,  93, 
99,  101;  orders  to  Wallace  car- 
ried by,  96-98 

Ruggles,  General  Daniel,  command 
assumed  by,  66;  statement  by, 
69 ;  artillery  called  up  by,  70,  71 

Rumsey,  Captain  I.  P.,  account  of 
events  preceding  battle  by,  41 

Russell,  Colonel  R.  M.,  brigade 
commanded  by,  60 

ST.    Louis,    headquarters    of    Fre- 
mont at,  22 ;  reference  to,  28,  30 
Sandidge,  Captain  L.  D.,  71 
Savannah      (Tennessee),     Smith's 
headquarters    at,    30;    reference 
to,    32,    47,   83;    troops   at,    32; 
concentration    of    Grant's    army 


at,  35;  Buell  ordered  to  con- 
centrate at,  36;  departure  of 
couriers  from,  36;  arrival  of 
Buell  at,  37;  failure  of  Buell  to 
report  arrival  at,  38;  Grant's 
headquarters  moved  from,  82 

Saxe,  Captain  Edward,  death  of, 
55 

Scribner  Brothers,  errors  in  his- 
tory published  by,  13 

Seay  Field,  53,  55 

Shambaugh,  Benj.  F.,  editor's  in- 
troduction by,  5 

Shaver,  Colonel  R.  G.,  brigade  com- 
manded by,  55,  56 

Sherman,  Buren  R..  6 

Sherman,  General  William  T.,  divi- 
sion commanded  by,  13,  16,  18, 
31,  32,  39,  40,  42,  57,  58;  ref- 
erence to,  14,  15,  44,  45,  62,  66, 
87;  orderly  of,  killed,  58;  at- 
tack upon  division  under,  59-62; 
losses  in  division  commanded  by, 
90 

Shiloh,  Battle  of,  Iowa  regiments 
engaged  in,  5 ;  misrepresentations 
of,  9,  10;  criticism  of  inaccurate 
accounts  of,  13-21 ;  relation  of, 
to  other  military  operations,  21- 
27;  events  preceding,  27,  38-47; 
condition  of  Union  army  at,  47, 
48;  description  of  field  of,  48- 
51;  description  of,  52-89;  first 
Union  officer  killed  in,  55 ;  part 
played  by  Buell  in,  72-77 ;  ' '  lost 
opportunity ' '  of  Confederates 
in,  77-79 ;  numbers  engaged  and 
losses  in,  89-91 ;  criticism  of 
Wallace's  conduct  at,  102,  103; 
maps  illustrative  of,  107-114 

Shiloh  Branch,  55,  58 


INDEX 


133 


Shiloh  National  Military  Park 
Commission,  map  prepared  by,  9 

Shunpike  road,  99 

Smith,  General  Charles  F.,  expedi- 
tion commanded  by,  23,  24,  29, 
30;  report  by,  30,  31;  reference 
to,  32,  63,  94;  difficulty  of  ex- 
pedition of,  34 

Snake  Creek,  46,  47,  49,  63,  72,  92, 
96,  98,  99,  100 

Spain  Field,  55 

Statham,  Colonel  Winfield  S.,  bri- 
gade commanded  by,  62,  64,  65 

Stephens,  Colonel  William  H.,  bri- 
gade commanded  by,  62,  65 

Stewart,  General  Alexander  P., 
brigade  commanded  by,  68 

Stibbs,  John  H.,  7 

Stone,  Major  William  M.,  6 

Stonylonesome  (Tennessee),  bri- 
gade of  Wallace's  division  at, 
91 ;  reference  to,  92 ;  beginning 
of  Wallace's  march  from,  99 

Stuart,  Colonel  David,  16,  63,  65; 
brigade  commanded  by,  57,  61 ; 
wound  received  by,  66 

Sunken  road,  63,  68 ;  description 
of,  69,  70 

Sweeny,  Colonel  Thomas  W.,  bri- 
gade commanded  by,  63,  66,  69, 
70 

TENNESSEE,  troops  of,  in  Battle  of 
Shiloh,  75 

Tennessee,  Army  of  the,  operations 
of,  21;  condition  of,  47,  48; 
losses  in,  90 

Tennessee  Eiver,  importance  of  line 
of,  21-23,  28;  expedition  up,  29; 
troops  on  west  side  of,  32;  coun- 
try west  of,  in  hands  of  Con- 
federates, 34;  plateau  on  east 


side  of,  48,  49;  difficulty  of 
crossing,  49 

Thompson,  Atwell,  battle-field  plat- 
ted by,  10 

Trabue,  Colonel  Robert  P.,  brigade 
commanded  by,  64 

Tuttle,  General  James  M.,  brigade 
commanded  by,  63,  66,  70;  ref- 
erence to,  67 ;  statements  by,  87 

UNION  army,  occupation  of  Nash- 
ville by,  27;  condition  of,  47, 
48;  readiness  of,  for  attack,  56, 
57;  last  attack  upon,  74-76; 
casualties  among  officers  in,  80, 
81;  stragglers  from,  81,  82;  total 
reinforcements  to,  86;  number 
of  troops  in,  89,  90;  losses  in, 
90,  91 

Urquhart,  Colonel  David,  statement 
by,  78,  79 

VEATCH,  Colonel  James  C.,  brigade 
commanded  by,  62 

Villard,  Henry,  errors  in  account 
of  Battle  of  Shiloh  by,  17;  ref- 
erence to,  84,  85 

WALLACE,  General  Lew.,  number  of 
troops  brought  into  battle  by, 
17;  errors  in  account  of  Battle 
of  Shiloh  by,  18,  19;  division 
commanded  by,  19,  30,  32,  63, 
88;  statements  by,  31,  32; 
knowledge  of  attack  possessed 
by,  45,  46;  failure  of,  to  inform 
Grant  of  attack,  46,  47;  refer- 
ence to,  60,  72;  Grant's  orders 
to,  82;  arrival  of,  85;  losses  in 
division  commanded  by,  90;  late 
arrival  of  division  of,  91-103 ; 


134 


INDEX 


criticism  of,  93;  march  of  divi- 
sion under,  99-101;  court  of  in- 
quiry requested  by,  102;  request 
withdrawn  by,  102;  letter  writ- 
ten by,  102,  103;  orders  carried 
to,  by  Baxter,  123 

Wallace,  General  William  H.  L., 
wound  received  by,  18;  refer- 
ence to,  41,  50;  division  com- 
manded by,  63;  orders  by,  67; 
death  of,  67;  losses  in  division 
commanded  by,  90;  letter  from 
Lew.  Wallace  to,  102,  103 

Waynesboro  (Tennessee),  desire 
of  Buell  to  camp  at,  37 


Webster,  Colonel  J.  D.,  artillery 
of,  78 

Williams,  Colonel  Nelson  G.,  bri- 
gade commanded  by,  62 

Wisconsin,  troops  of,  in  Battle  of 
Shiloh,  55 

Withers,  General  Jones  M.,  divi- 
sion commanded  by,  74,  78,  79 

Wood,  General  Sterling  A.  M.,  bri- 
gade commanded  by,  55,  56,  60 

Wood,  General  Thomas  J.,  Grant's 
orders  to,  83;  division  command- 
ed by,  86 

Woodyard,  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Humphrey  M.,  54 


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